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I. INTRODUCTION
The ordinary human response to atrocities is to banish
them from consciousness. Certain violations of the social
compact are too terrible to know about or to utter aloud.
This is the meaning of the word "unspeakable." Atroc-
ities, however, refuse to be buried. As powerful as the desire
to deny atrocities is the conviction that denial does not
work....
Remembering and telling the truth about terrible events
are essential tasks, both for the healing of individuals and for
the restoration of the social order. The conffict between the
will to deny horrible events-the will to forget them-and
the will to proclaim them aloud is the central dialectic of psy-
chological trauma.'
In the abstract, it is relatively easy for many people to accept the
concept of traumatic amnesia. The idea that someone might bury the
1. Judith L. Herman, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric
Association 2 (May 22, 1994) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter Herman Address]; see also JUDrrH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 1
(1992) ("People who have survived atrocities often tell their stories in a highly emotional,
contradictory, and fragmented manner which undermines their credibility .... [Flar too
often secrecy prevails, and the story of the traumatic event surfaces not as a verbal narra-
tive but as a symptom.").
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memory of a terrifying experience in order to survive it and continue
functioning is not beyond the realm of possibility to the average per-
son.2 Stranger things have happened. And there is still so much to be
learned about how the human mind works.3
Yet the scenario of an adult recovering long-repressed memories
of child sexual abuse4 can strike fear into the hearts of parents and
others in constant contact with children. Visions of being hauled into
court to defend against charges of child molestation scare those who
are guilty, of course. But these visions are also threatening to the in-
nocent who hear of psychotherapists brainwashing patients into be-
lieving they were abused as children and who shudder to think they
could be accused of such an unspeakable atrocity.5 The fear is under-
standable; the mere passage of time makes it extremely difficult to
disprove the charges.6
Accusations of child sexual abuse often make their way into the
glare of media attention, and when they move into the legal arena, the
intense emotions fueling the debate over repressed memory can reach
a fever pitch. In the last decade increasing numbers of adult survivors
have ified civil suits against their abusers. 7 Due to the inherent diffi-
culties in proving their cases, many plaintiffs call expert witnesses to
help overcome the disbelief and skepticism of judges and juries.8
2. See, eg., People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990) ("It is clearly within
the realm of all human experience to expect that a person would react to a traumatic event
and that such reactions would not be consistent or predictable in all persons.").
3. See, e.g., Leon Jaroff, Lies of the Mind, TinE, Nov. 29, 1993, at 52, 55 (reporting
investigations and debates by American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, and American Medical Association). For a summary of the most recent scien-
tific research into the neurology of memory, see Sharon Begley & Martha Brant, You Must
Remember This, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 1994, at 68.
4. This Comment adopts the definition of "sexual abuse" in title 42 of the U.S. Code:
(A) the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of any
child to engage in, or assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit
conduct or simulation of such conduct for the purpose of producing a visual de-
piction of such conduct; or (B) the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form
of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(7)(A)-(B) (1988).
5. See infra parts II.D.2 (discussing litigation from defendant's perspective), IV.A.2
(noting claims that therapists implant false memories of child sexual abuse).
6. See infra note 118 (discussing loss of evidence, memories, and witnesses over time
as policy rationale for statutes of limitations).
7. Julie S. Silberg, Comment, Memory Repression: Should It Toll the Statutory Limita-
tions Period in Child Sexual Abuse Cases?, 39 WAYNm L. REv. 1589, 1589-90 (1993).
8. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST,
May 1993, at 518, 522-23 (reporting juror simulation study in which more subjects were
skeptical about repressed memory claim than nonrepressed memory claim); Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories Shattered Lives, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at
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However, psychologists and psychiatrists are deeply divided on the re-
liability of repressed memories recovered many years later.9 If the
experts cannot agree, how are the courts to decide whether expert
testimony on this subject should be admissible?
Part II of this Comment reviews current information on the inci-
dence of child sexual abuse and the development of legal remedies for
child sexual abuse claims. This is followed by an overview of the con-
troversy regarding repressed memory and the issues involved in re-
lated litigation. Part III begins with data supporting the existence of
repressed memories, then articulates the reasons for admitting expert
evidence in actions brought by survivors of abuse. Part IV presents
the arguments against the validity of repressed memories, then fo-
cuses on why expert testimony regarding repressed memories should
be inadmissible in civil suits for child sexual abuse. Notwithstanding
the dearth of case law on the specific issue of repressed memories, the
analysis in Parts III through VI draws from analogous case law on the
admissibility of expert testimony on child sexual abuse-cases where
the victim is still a child, as opposed to an adult survivor 1 -and hyp-
notically refreshed testimony. Parts V and VI propose judicial and
legislative solutions, respectively, which represent an effort to balance
the conflicting interests of the parties involved.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prevalence of Child Sexual Abuse
Until the 1970s, the prevalence of child sexual abuse had been
seriously underestimated.11 Documented skepticism and minimiza-
70, 70 ("Across the country, despite society's abhorrence of sex crimes, judges and juries
are beginning to view with skepticism some sex abuse claims based on recovered memo-
ries."). Similar considerations affect litigation based not on repressed memory, but on the
allegations of a child victim because "[c]hild sexual abuse is often exceedingly difficult to
prove. Molestation occurs in secret, and the child is usually the only eyewitness." John
E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEn. L. REv. 1, 3
(1989). "Faced with a vacuum of evidence, attorneys increasingly turn to physicians, psy-
chiatrists, social workers, and psychologists to provide expert testimony regarding child
sexual abuse." Id. at 4.
9. Compare infra part I.A (supporting theory of repressed memory) with part IV.A
(criticizing theory of repressed memory).
10. In contrast to the scarcity of case law on expert testimony regarding repressed
memory, "[b]eginning in approximately 1980, a substantial body of case law emerged on
expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation. An explosion of decisions occurred in the
years following 1985." Myers et al., supra note 8, at 4.
11. See Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45
VAND. L. Rav. 1185, 1196-97 (1992); David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony
[Vol. 28:1345
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tion of the problem can be traced back to the 1890s when Sigmund
Freud refused to believe large numbers of patients who reported that
they had been sexually abused as children.'2 Freud first theorized that
sexual contact with their fathers had caused his patients' symptoms,
but he abandoned this theory when it caused a furor in Victorian-era
Vienna and he became personally uncomfortable with the high preva-
lence of incest reported by patients. 3 Nearly a century later, research
based on general population samples suggests that the incidence of
child sexual abuse in the United States is alarmingly high.' 4 The esti-
mates for women range from 12% 1 to 38%16 and for men, from 3%17
to 16%.18 Of these, at least 50% knew their abusers,19 and 24% to
50% were sexually abused by family members.20
About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of
Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 1, 2-5 (1986).
12. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 1, at 13-14; McCord, supra note 11, at 2-3.
13. CHRISTINE A. CouRToIs, HEALING THE INCEST WOUND: ADULT SURVIVORS IN
THERAPY 7 (1988).
14. See, e.g., DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., WHEN THE VICriM IS A CILD: ISSUES FOR
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 2-4 (1985).
15. Id. at 2-3 (citation omitted).
16. WOMEN'S ACrION COALITION, WAC STATS: THE FACTS ABOUT WOmEN 48
(1993) (citations omitted) [hereinafter WAC STATS] ("[Thirty-eight percent] of women
have been sexually abused by an adult relative, acquaintance or stranger before 18.
[TWenty-eight percent] of women have been seriously abused before age 14, 12% by some-
one in their family."); Diana E.H. Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial
and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 133, 137
(1983).
17. WHrrcoMB ET AL., supra note 14, at 2-4 (citation omitted).
18. WAC STAT, supra note 16, at 49; see also DAVID FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICriM-
IZED CHILDREN 56 (1979) (estimating incidence of child sexual abuse in American males at
8.6%).
19. Rayline A. De Vine, Sexual Abuse of Children: An Overview of the Problem, in
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SE-
LECrED READINGS 3,5 (Barbara M. Jones et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN]. Other surveys suggest the figure may be higher. WAC STATS, supra note 16,
at 49 ("Fewer than 20% of children are abused by strangers."); Lucy Berliner & Doris
Stevens, Advocating for Sexually Abused Children in the Criminal Justice System, in SEX-
UAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, supra, at 47, 47 (estimating that 85% of victims knew their
abusers).
20. Allan R. De Jong et al., Epidemiologic Variations in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 155,157 (1983); see also De Vine, supra note 19, at 5 (reporting
30% to 50% were sexually abused by family members). Finkelhor estimates that less than
one-third of all child sexual abuse consists of father-daughter abuse. DAVID FIN LHOR,
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 226-27 (1984).
The American Psychological Association estimates that... [f]ather-daughter sex-
ual involvement... account[s] for about 25 percent of [incest] cases; stepfather-
stepdaughter relationships ... account for 25 percent more. The rest are attrib-
uted to abuse by brothers, half-brothers, brothers-in-law, uncles, grandfathers,
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Exact figures are unavailable for several reasons.21  Despite
greater public awareness of child sexual abuse, many cases still go un-
reported.22 Statistics vary according to the methods by which they are
compiled, the populations studied,24 and the definitions given to var-
ious terms.2 Nevertheless, all experts agree that no matter what
methodology is used, the research literature reports "astonishingly
high rates of child sexual abuse.
26
Society's late-blooming awareness of child sexual abuse is re-
markable for the impetus it has given to increased efforts to protect
adoptive fathers and cousins. Boys are also drawn into incestuous situations, but
the data on their numbers are even more unreliable.
Nadine Brozan, Helping to Heal the Scars Left by Incest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1984, at B6.
21. RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, THE COMMON SECRET, SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 13 (1984) ("It is presently impossible to give accurate esti-
mates of the total incidence of sexual abuse in the United States; they vary enormously,
depending upon how the information has been obtained.").
22. Silberg, supra note 7, at 1592-93. One researcher estimates that less than one-fifth
of all cases of child sexual abuse are ever reported. FINKELHOR, supra note 20, at 232; see
also WAC STATS, supra note 16, at 48 ("In 1991, 2.7 million reports of child abuse were
recorded nationally; 15%, (or 404,100) were child sex abuse cases."); Judy Mann, Sexual
Abuse, WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 1984, at B1 ("A retrospective study of 1,200 college-age
women found that 28 percent had sexual experience with an adult before they were 13, but
only 6 percent of the incidents had been reported to authorities.").
23. The two primary sources of estimated figures are: (1) reports to Jaw enforcement
or child protection authorities mandated by law in every state; and (2) sociological studies
which use differing methodologies and definitions of child sexual abuse. John E.B. Myers,
Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation: Recommendations
for Improved Fact Finding and Child Protection, 28 J. FAM. L. 1, 3 (1989-1990).
24. See FnqKELHOR, supra note 20, at 228-29; Lucy Berliner, Nature and Dynamics of
Child Sexual Abuse, in A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1, 1-2 (Josephine
Bulkley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994); Myers et al., supra note 8, at 52 & n.202.
25. See, eg., Meredith S. Fahn, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody Disputes:
Getting to the Truth of the Matter, 25 FAM. L.Q. 193, 197,200 (1991); Russell, supra note 16,
at 133 ("There is no consensus among researchers.., about what sex acts constitute sexual
abuse, what age defines a child, nor even whether the concept of child sexual abuse is
preferable to others such as ... child molestation... or child rape."); Roland C. Summit,
The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 177,186-
88 (1983); Cheri L. Wood, Comment, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous
Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1367, 1380 n.89 (1994) ("A common problem
that has rendered statistics concerning valid sexual abuse allegations less reliable is the
confusion of the terms 'unsubstantiated' and 'false allegations': researchers and others
have sometimes treated unsubstantiated allegations as false." (citations omitted)); see also
David L. Corwin et al., Child Sexual Abuse and Custody Disputes: No Easy Answers, 2 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 91, 94-95 (1987) (explaining that "unsubstantiated" means in-
sufficient evidence existed to affirmatively conclude child was sexually abused); Myers,
supra note 23, at 23 ("A fabricated report is a deliberate falsehood.").
26. Russell, supra note 16, at 144; see also Silberg, supra note 7, at 1591 ("The number
of child sexual abuse victims is staggering." (footnote omitted)).
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children and prosecute child molesters.27 It is perhaps even more sig-
nificant for adult survivors who were victims at a time in history when
their needs were ignored, their trauma went untreated, and their
secrets remained hidden?18 Although reporting of child sexual abuse
has increased in recent years29-in part due to mandatory reporting
laws 3°-it has been, and continues to be, rare for victims to complain
immediately after the abuse because of guilt, embarrassment, or
fear.31 To cope with the horror of their experiences32 and the "con-
spiracy of silence" 33 that shields perpetrators from accountability,
many child victims develop dissociative defense mechanismsa4 similar
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (Supp. V 1994) (establishing child victims' and child
witnesses' rights in child abuse and neglect cases). Provisions include alternatives to live
in-court testimony such as live testimony by two-way closed circuit television, id.
§ 3509(b)(1), and videotaped depositions, id. § 3509(b)(2); privacy protections, including
confidentiality of information, id. § 3509(d)(1), filing under seal, id. § 3509(d)(2), and pro-
tective orders, id. § 3509(d)(3); authority for the court to exclude from the courtroom "all
persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case," id.
§ 3509(e); preparation of a victim impact statement for the perpetrator's probation officer,
id. § 3509(f); use of multidisciplinary child abuse teams to provide child services, id.
§ 3509(g), guardians ad litem to protect the child's best interests, id. § 3509(h), and adult
attendants to provide emotional support to the child, id. § 3509(i); expedited proceedings
and continuances where necessary, id § 3509(j); extension of the statute of limitations until
the child reaches the age of 25 years, i § 3509(k); and permission for the use of testimo-
nial aids such as "anatomical dolls, puppets, drawings, [or] mannequins," id. § 3509(1). See
infra note 30 for mandatory reporting statutes.
28. See HmrAN, supra note 1, at 7-9, 28-32. The author writes:
For most of the twentieth century, it was the study of combat veterans that led to
the development of a body of knowledge about traumatic disorders. Not until the
women's liberation movement of the 1970s was it recognized that the most com-
mon post-traumatic disorders are those not of men in war but of women in civil-
ian life.
Id. at 28.
29. WHrrCOMB ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
30. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (1988 & Supp. V 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (Harrison 1994); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp.
1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Anderson Supp. 1994).
31. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. CRNICH & KIMBERLY A. CRNICH, SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF
TRUTH: SUING CHLD SEXUAL ABUSERs-A LEGAL GUIDE FOR SURVIVORS AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS 51 (1992); Summit, supra note 25, at 186-87 (noting that "[m]ost... sexual
abuse is never disclosed" and that "[o]f the minority of incest secrets that are disclosed ...
very few are subsequently reported to outside agencies"); Silberg, supra note 7, at 1592-93
(explaining why "seventy-five to ninety percent of all incest survivors reach adulthood
without disclosing the abuse").
32. See, e.g., Herman Address, supra note 1, at 4 ("[P]eople [in a state of terror] may
experience profound perceptual distortion, including insensitivity to pain, depersonaliza-
tion, derealization, time slowing, and amnesia.").
33. See generally SANDRA BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THm TRAUMA OF IN-
CEsT (1978) (examining dynamics of and society's response to incestuous assault).
34. More commonly known as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the psychological
impact of traumatic events on a person
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to those observed in combat veterans35 and victims of other atroci-
ties.36 In addition, pioneering researchers report that "sexual abuse in
childhood can leave victims with permanently weakened immune
may be either a combination of physical and mental disorders, or solely a residual
mental incapacity continuing after a physical injury has healed. PTSD can exist
even when a trauma victim has not suffered demonstrable physical injury. A sex-
ually abused child ... may exhibit symptoms of unnatural secrecy, feelings of
helplessness or entrapment, delayed or conflicting disclosure, retraction, and vari-
ous phobias. A practical consequence is that the child may repress or delay dis-
closing the sexual abuse until after the pertinent... statute of limitations has run.
James W. Harshaw III, Comment, Not Enough Time?: The Constitutionality of Short Stat-
utes of Limitation for Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 753, 756-57
(1989) (citations omitted), quoted in Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Iowa 1990);
see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 393 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (describing PTSD as
"characterized by the reexperiencing of an extremely traumatic event accompanied by
symptoms of increased arousal and by avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma").
35. See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 26-28, 32.
36. Those who characterize repressed memories of child sexual abuse as mere fantasy
often draw a misconceived analogy to Holocaust survivors who suffered enormously during
World War II yet never "forgot" what happened to them. See, e.g., David G. Savage,
Doubt Growing by Experts on Cases of "Recovered Memory," L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1993,
at Al, A28 (reporting comparison drawn by psychiatrist Paul McHugh). The comparison
is misguided for two reasons. Frst, it is not true. Bruno Bettelheim has described re-
pressing his memories of Dachau and Buchenwald:
A split was soon forced upon me, the split between the inner self that might be
able to retain its integrity, and the rest of the personality that would have to
submit and adjust for survival.
Anything that had to do with the present hardships was so distressing that
one wished to repress it, to forget it. Only what was unrelated to present suffer-
ing was emotionally neutral and could hence be remembered.
David Calof, Facing the Truth About False Memory, FAM. THERAPY NETWORcER, Sept./
Oct. 1993, at 39, 42 (quoting Bruno Bettelheim).
Second, as terrible as the Nazi concentration camps were, the suffering was en masse.
The fact that each prisoner's agony was shared by millions of others did nothing to amelio-
rate their pain, but it does distinguish the Holocaust from the situation in which most
sexually abused children are trapped-completely alone, often feeling somehow responsi-
ble or deserving of the abuse, and reluctant to disclose it for fear of being blamed or not
believed. See, eg., Mary S. Wylie, The Shadow of a Doubt, FAM. THERAPY NETWORKER,
SeptJOct. 1993, at 18, 26-27. Moreover, unlike the survivors of publicly acknowledged
atrocities, adult survivors of child sexual abuse often do not know why they have signs of
PTSD until they do the painful work of recovery. Calof, supra, at 40. Calof describes
survivors as
veterans of intensely private wars that had taken place in barns, attics and subur-
ban houses with the blinds drawn. Their wounds were never reported in newspa-
pers or discussed with family members. There were rarely any witnesses other
than the people who hurt them .... [T]heir childhood rapes and beatings were
encoded into memory in fragments ... when their hearts and minds were flooded
with adrenaline. They didn't remember them the way one remembers a walk in
the park, and they doubted the fragments they did recall.
1d at 40-41.
[Vol. 28:1345
June 1995] EXPERT TESTIMONY ON REPRESSED MEMORY 1353
function .... 'Abuse seems to be a biology altering experience. It
changes the brain's stress response system.' ",37
Dissociation 38 can take a number of forms, including traumatic
amnesia-more commonly known as repressed memory.39 Simply
put,
something happens that is so shocking that the mind grabs
hold of the memory and pushes it underground, into some
inaccessible comer of the unconscious. There it sleeps for
years, or even decades, or even forever-isolated from the
rest of mental life. Then, one day, it may rise up and emerge
into consciousness 40
Repression41 of traumatic memories keeps painful or unacceptable
ideas, impulses, and feelings out of conscious awareness42 and "en-
able[s] the victim to survive by controlling thoughts and feelings to the
point at which there is no recognition of victimization."'43 Recall of
such memories can be triggered by psychotherapy," hypnosis,4 so-
37. Marilyn Elias, Sexual Abuse Can Weaken Victim's Immune System, USA TODAY,
May 24, 1994, at 1A (quoting Dr. Frank Putnam of the National Institute of Mental
Health).
38. The term "dissociation" refers to a group of disorders defined as "a disruption in
the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the
environment." DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 477. Dissociative disorders include dissociative
amnesia, "an inability to recall important personal information, usually of a traumatic or
stressful nature, that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness." Id.
39. See John Briere, Adult Memories of Childhood Trauma: Current Controversies,
Abridged and Revised Version of an Invited Presentation to the American Psychiatric As-
sociation 1 (May 26, 1993) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
40. Loftus, supra note 8, at 518.
41. It is important to distinguish repression, which "operates automatically, outside of
conscious awareness and control," from suppression, "an active, deliberate, conscious at-
tempt to forget acutely painful or unacceptable thoughts and wishes by diverting attention
to other matters." Kanovitz, supra note 11, at 1204 n.60.
42. HENRY P. LAUGaN, THE EGO AND ITS DEFESES 358 (1970).
43. Naomi Berkowitz, Balancing the Statute of Limitations and the Discovery Rule:
Some Victims of Incestuous Abuse Are Denied Access to Washington Courts-Tyson v. Ty-
son, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 721, 729 (1987).
44. Id.; see, e.g., Archibald v. Archibald, 826 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Me. 1993) (stating that
plaintiff alleged therapy enabled her to remember physical and sexual assaults); Baily v.
Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 803 (E.D. Pa.) (noting that plaintiff asserted "that he 'first became
consciously aware' of the alleged abuse... during the course of psychotherapy"), aff'd
without opinion, 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1991); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d
713, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (indicating that plaintiff claimed therapy stimulated recollection of
abuse).
45. See, eg., Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1503 (D. Conn. 1994) (stating that
plaintiff claimed memories came back after hypnosis but were not "hypnotically
refreshed").
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dium amytal or sodium pentothal,4 or events completely unrelated to
therapy.
47
B. Legal Remedies for Child Sexual Abuse: An Overview
The first statutes prohibiting incest in the United States were
property laws based on the idea that women and children were chat-
tel;48 these statutes were designed to prevent damage to the "stock."
'49
As awareness of the harm caused by child sexual abuse increased, leg-
islators toughened criminal penalties and established procedures to
make courtrooms less frightening for child witnesses.5 Until the
1980s, civil remedies were available only for child victims or adults
who filed claims soon after attaining the age of majority.51 Survivors
who had repressed their memories of the abuse and then recovered
them many years later-When they were finally able to confront
them-were effectively blocked from seeking legal redress for their
injuries by traditional statutes of limitations. 2
Although no amount of money could completely and adequately
compensate a person who has endured the horror of child sexual
abuse, 3 a survivor who recovers traumatic memories in adulthood
46. See, e.g., Katy Butler, A House Divided: Clashing Memories, Mixed Memories,
L.A. TimEs, June 26, 1994, at 12 (Magazine) (reporting case where accused father sued
therapist and psychiatrist who used sodium amytal to recover daughter's memories of al-
leged child sexual abuse).
47. See infra part III.A.4.
48. Norrie Clevenger, Note, Statute of Limitations: Childhood Victims of Sexual Abuse
Bringing Civil Actions Against Their Perpetrators After Attaining the Age of Majority, 30 J.
FAM. L. 447, 448 n.10 (1991-1992); see also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Utah
1983) (referring to "the archaic notion of 'wife as chattel' "); Hillary Rodham, Children
Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REv. 487, 489 (1973) ("In eighteenth century English
common law... [c]hildren were regarded as chattels of the family .... "). For example, in
a contest for guardianship, the California Supreme Court once stated:
The father's right, at least so far as the services of the child are concerned, is
strictly a property right, for the loss of which-as in the case of servants gener-
ally-an action could at common law be maintained; and in other respects the
right, though not commonly spoken of as such, is of essentially the same nature as
the right of property.
In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 382 (1900).
49. Clevenger, supra note 48, at 448 n.10.
50. See, e.g., Kanovitz, supra note 11, at 1197; supra note 27.
51. See CRNICH & CNICH, supra note 31, at 32-41; Silberg, supra note 7, at 1601.
52. See CRNICH & CR icH, supra note 31, at 33; Loftus, supra note 8, at 520; Cleven-
ger, supra note 48, at 448; Silberg, supra note 7, at 1601-02.
53. Short-term effects of child sexual abuse include anxiety, fearfulness, sleep distur-
bances, insomnia, nightmares, somatic complaints, and psychosomatic disorders. See Ar-
thur H. Green, Overview of the Literature on Child Sexual Abuse, in DIANE H. ScHErKY &
ARTHUR H. GREEN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE AND
LEGAL PROFESsIONALS 30, 41 (1988). Long-term effects may include an inability to trust,
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may now bring a civil suit against the perpetrator in more than
twenty-three states.5 4 Remedies may include compensatory dam-
ages,55 punitive damages, 6 or injunctive relief, such as a court order
to protect children still under the care of the perpetrator.5 7 To date at
least twenty-one states have enacted special statutes of limitations for
claims of child sexual abuse.5 8 Typically, these statutes provide that
the action must be filed within a certain number of years after the
plaintiff either (1) reaches the age of majority or (2) knew or had rea-
son to know that sexual abuse caused the injury.5 9 Absent specific
low self-esteem, shame, guilt, depression, hysterical seizures, poor body image-which may
be aggravated by pregnancy or venereal disease-social withdrawal, difficulties with peer
relationships, impaired school performance, or disturbances in sexual functioning and gen-
der role. See id. at 41-44. Extremely severe traumatization can lead to PTSD, multiple
personality disorder, suicidal behavior, or borderline personality disorder. See id. at 42-44.
54. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 8, at 70; see infra notes 58, 61 and accompanying
text.
55. A plaintiff may seek compensatory damages for lost income due to inability to
work; medical, psychological, or psychiatric bills; pain and suffering; loss of consortium; or
loss of enjoyment of life. CRNICH & CRNiCH, supra note 31, at 27, 46. Injuries may include
any of the following: phobias; intrusive flashbacks; nightmares; multiple personality disor-
der; depression; anxiety; gastrointestinal or gynecological disorders; sleep disorders; physi-
cal ailments with no organic origin; sexual dysfunction, including aversion, promiscuity, or
prostitution; escapism through alcoholism, drug addiction, or eating disorders; suicidal
thoughts or actions; self-mutilation; swallowing and gagging sensitivity; psychic numbing;
inability to trust; feelings of guilt, shame, low self-esteem, or helplessness; clinging behav-
ior; inability to recognize or express anger, inability to care for body; poor body image;
high risk-taking or no risk-taking ability; and others. See E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVI-
VORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND ITS AFREFFEcrs IN WOMEN xxvii-xxx (1990); COUR-
TOIS, supra note 13, at 9.
56. See CRNiCH & CRNiCH, supra note 31, at 47-48.
57. A plaintiff also may ask the court to order therapy for the perpetrator or to order
the perpetrator to pay for therapy for other family members affected by the abuse. Id at
49.
58. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140 (1994); CAL. CV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp.
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103.7 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577d
(West 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West Supp. 1995); ILJ. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para.
5/13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp. 1994); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon
Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.215
(Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(6) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12.117 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-10-25 (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 522, 560 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie Supp. 1994);
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1995).
59. E.g., MINrN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (requiring commencement of action "within six
years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the
sexual abuse").
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legislation, some courts will apply the discovery rule' or other theo-
ries to toll the applicable statute of limitations under certain condi-
tions.6 In determining whether a victim should have known of the
60. The discovery rule, also known as the doctrine of delayed discovery, "provides that
the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discover[ed], or through the use of reason-
able diligence should have discovered, that [he or she was] injured and that the injury was
caused by the defendant's misconduct." Melissa G. Salten, Note, Statutes of Limitations in
Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 213 (1984);
see Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Iowa 1990) ("Th[e] repression syndrome, to-
gether with other considerations of fairness, have prompted courts to apply the discovery
rule liberally in child sex abuse cases."); cf Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1949)
(holding that discovery rule applied to time limitations of Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)).
61. Some courts will apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for the
period during which a victim is unaware of the harm or does not realize that the perpetra-
tor's actions caused the harm. In some jurisdictions, application of the discovery rule ini-
tially depends on whether the case is categorized as 'Type 1 or Type 2, a distinction first
made in Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-70 (N.D. Ili. 1988).
Type 1 cases are those in which the plaintiff claims to have known about the child
sexual abuse at or before majority but did not realize that physical or psychological
problems were caused by the abuse. Id. Courts that apply the discovery rule to Type 1
cases reason that the emotional trauma caused by the abuse justifies tolling. See Petersen
v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 23-25 (Nev. 1990) (requiring clear and convincing corroboration);
Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23,
27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). Some courts refuse to apply the discovery rule in Type 1 cases on
the ground that although the connection between the abuse and later problems was made
only recently, the plaintiff admits being aware of the wrongful conduct; thus the plaintiff
was put on notice of possible injury and had a duty to investigate possible claims. In these
cases courts have concluded that application of the discovery rule would undercut the pro-
tection of the statute of limitations. See Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512,
1519-21 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Marsha V. v. Gardner, 231 Cal. App. 3d 265, 271-73, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 473, 476-77 (1991); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1020-21, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 373 (1987), superseded by CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 340.1; E.W. v. D.C.H., 754
P.2d 817,820 (Mont. 1988); Bassile v. Covenant House, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233,235-36 (Sup. Ct.
1991); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Some courts will apply the discovery rule to Type 2 cases-those in which the plaintiff
claims to have repressed the memory of the abuse until shortly before suit was filed and
therefore did not know or could not reasonably have known of the actionable injury. See
Nicolette v. Carey, 751 F. Supp. 695, 699-700 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at
1369-70; Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 1617-19, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610-11
(1990); D.P. v. M.J.O., 640 N.E.2d 1323, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (dictum); Callahan, 464
N.W.2d at 273; Lemmerman v. Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal
granted, 521 N.W.2d 14 (Mich. 1994); E.W., 754 P.2d at 820 (by implication); Petersen, 792
P.2d at 23-25 (requiring clear and convincing corroboration); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638
A.2d 797, 799-800 (N.H. 1994); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 585 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1990); Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 909; Hammer, 418
N.W.2d at 27; cf. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1986) (apply-
ing discovery rule where plaintiff's delayed knowledge was caused by counselor's sexual
misconduct). However, some courts have refused to apply the discovery rule even in Type
2 cases. See Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying South Carolina law);
Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802, 811 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 950 F.2d 721 (3d
Cir. 1991); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per
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abuse, courts apply an objective reasonable person standard, as op-
posed to a subjective test based on the victim's mental and emotional
state.62
As more and more survivors clear the initial hurdle of motions to
dismiss on the basis of stale claims, the focus of judicial inquiry has
shifted to the admissibility of evidence based on recovered memories
of child sexual abuse.63 At present very little case law exists on this
point.' Many suits are eventually settled out of court, and most of
the published opinions to date reflect decisions based on grounds
other than evidentiary issues.65 However, admissibility is an impor-
tant issue in those cases that do go to trial. As the Utah Supreme
Court observed, "Because of the dearth of empirical scientific evi-
dence regarding the authenticity and reliability of revived memories,
the inherent reliability and admissibility of expert witness testimony
curiam), cause dismissed, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1990); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624,
631-32 (Okla. 1992); Bowser v. Guttendorf, 541 A2d 377, 379-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988);
Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 229-30 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), superseded by WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 4.16.340.
A few courts will consider applying other theories, such as equitable estoppel, to toll
the statute of limitations. See John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 444-
46,769 P.2d 948,951-52,256 Cal. Rptr. 766,769-70 (1989); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 584
N.Y.S.2d 713, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1992). But see Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359, 360-62
(Sup. Ct. 1991) (refusing to apply equitable estoppel despite defendant's alleged admission
of sexual abuse). Another tolling theory is fraudulent concealment. See Baily, 763 F.
Supp. at 811; Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E2d 246, 252-53 (Ind. 1993). Alternatively, some
courts may toll the statute of limitations for insanity. See Carlson v. Rice, 832 F. Supp. 17,
18 (D. Me. 1993); Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988);
Jones, 576 A.2d at 321; Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
For a comprehensive treatment of extended statutes of limitation and application of
the discovery rule in child sexual abuse suits, see Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Run-
ning of Limitations Against Action for Civil Damages for Sexual Abuse of Child, 9 A.L.R.
5th 321 (1993).
62. See, e.g., Baily, 763 F. Supp. at 806 (denying plaintiff benefit of discovery rule due
to Pennsylvania's objective standard of reasonable diligence); ABC & XYZ v. Archdiocese
of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 513 N.W.2d 482,486 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (granting summary
judgment where plaintiff had not repressed her memory of abuse, but claimed, she was
unable "to see the situation clearly and recognize that she had been a victim of abuse" until
she learned that defendant priest had been accused of abusing other young women).
63. See, e.g., Hewczuk v. Sambor, No. 91-6562, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2417, at *4-6
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1993); Herald v. Hood, No. 15986, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3688, at *16-
20 (Ohio Ct. App. July 21, 1993).
64. See infra part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Hewczuk and Herald cases. As experts
in child sexual abuse litigation have noted, "[w]hen complex new subjects are introduced in
the law of evidence, it takes a number of years for courts to achieve consensus regarding
basic principles and applications." Myers et al., supra note 8, at 4-5.
65. Loftus, supra note 8, at 522; see, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.
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regarding memory repression and revival may be an issue that will
have to be reached at trial."66
It is only a matter of time before evidentiary questions make their
way to the appellate courts.67 Judging from the way courts have dealt
with novel scientific evidence in the past,6 it is likely they will proceed
with caution in this area as well. However, such an approach would
be inconsistent with the liberal policy underlying the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the rule announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 69 Instead, this
Comment proposes that courts allow the trier of fact to weigh re-
pressed memory evidence.
U.S. District Judge D. Lowell Jensen took this very position when
he overturned the 1990 murder conviction of George Thomas Frank-
lin." At Franklin's California trial the prosecution relied heavily on
the testimony of the defendant's daughter, who claimed she had re-
pressed her memory of witnessing the crime for twenty years.7 ' Judge
Jensen overturned the conviction on constitutional grounds: (1) the
prosecution had violated Franklin's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination-when it told the jury that the defendant's
silence in response to his daughter's accusation was proof that he was
guilty; and (2) the trial judge had improperly excluded defense evi-
66. Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
67. See Kanovitz, supra note 11, at 1186 ("[R]ecent changes will force the legal system
to examine whether the memory restoring techniques used in psychotherapy can produce
memory that is trustworthy enough for the legal system to accept."); id. at 1193 (predicting
that memory restoration techniques used in psychotherapy "are destined to become critical
issues in these trials").
68. The most commonly cited authority for a conservative approach to novel scientific
evidence is Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R.
EvID. 702, construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
69. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); see infra text accompanying notes 140, 259.
70. Rex Bossert, Judge Overturns Conviction in "Memory" Case, L.A. DAILY J., Apr.
5, 1995, at 1.
71. Id See generally HARRY N. MAcLEAN, ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE STORY OF
MEMORY, MURDER, AND TrE LAw passim (1993) (describing successful prosecution of
Franklin in San Mateo County, California, for murder of eight-year-old Susan Nason in
1969).
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dence showing that details in the daughter's testimony could have
been obtained from media accounts of the case.72 Significantly, Judge
Jensen based his ruling on these two errors, not on the defense's argu-
ment that repressed memories are unreliable.7"
[The judge] said that while the debate among mental health
experts continues, "they can never establish whether or not
the asserted memory is true."
Jensen further said that while such testimony is not to be
considered inherently unconstitutional, it "is admitted into
evidence and is then tested as to credibility by the time-
honored procedures of the adversary system."
74
Speculation about future legal developments must include the
possibility that state legislatures will take action to supersede con-
servative judicial decisions, as they have in California,75 Illinois,7 6 and
Washington.77 In addition, survivors' rights advocates are actively ap-
plying political pressure for reform on Capitol Hill.78
C. The Controversy over Repressed Memory
The phenomenon of repressed memory has sparked a heated
debate within the mental health profession 79 and the legal commu-
72. Bossert, supra note 70, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. See DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987), super-
seded by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1995).
76. See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988), superseded by ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-202.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
77. See Tyson v. ITyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), superseded by WAsH.
Rv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1995).
78. See infra note 89 and text accompanying note 449.
79. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Donald H. Stolar, Ph.D., associate clinical pro-
fessor of psychiatry and assistant clinical professor of pediatrics, UCLA School of
Medicine (Aug. 19, 1994) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter Stolar Interview]. A few years ago experts appeared to be divided along clear
lines. Id. On one side were practitioners who work with abuse survivors and witness the
retrieval of repressed memories on a daily basis. Id. On the other side were memory
researchers who conduct experiments in laboratories and reject clinicians' observations as
proof of the validity of repressed memories. Id. According to Dr. Stolar, however, the gap
between clinicians and researchers is narrowing because, as the result of recent malpractice
verdicts against therapists, "clinicians now realize they have to be careful with their cli-
ents." Id. Nevertheless, the dispute continues unabated. For information supporting the
validity of repressed memory theory, see HERMAN, supra note 1; LENORE TERR, Too
SCARED TO CRY: PsYcHic TRAUMA IN CHILDHOOD (1990). For opposing views, see ELIZ-
ABETH LOFTUs & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY (1994);
MARK PENDERORAST, VICIMS OF MEMORY: INCEST ACCUSATIONS AND SHATrERED
LrvEs (1995).
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nity. ° It also has received a great deal of attention from the mass
media,s1 which occasionally obscures the issue with sensationalism,
misinformation, and trivialization of the problem of child sexual
abuse.8 2 The controversy is not so much over whether severely trau-
matic experiences can be tucked away into the unconscious.8 3 As the
chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court has written,
[i]t is undisputed that memory may be repressed. Repres-
sion can be caused by extreme physical injury (such as that
experienced by the "Central Park Jogger" who was brutally
beaten and repeatedly raped and yet retains no memory of
the incident), and by sheer mental shock.., such as a war
veteran who represses memories of battle even though he or
she personally was not injured. Thus, undeniably there are
also adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse who have re-
pressed memories of those experiences due.., to severe psy-
chological shock.'
Rather, there are sharp differences of opinion and many unan-
swered questions about nearly everything else.8 5 Can repressed mem-
80. See, e.g., Tyson, 727 P.2d at 226-30 (majority and concurring opinions); id. at 230-
39 (dissenting opinions); Repressed Memories: Should Child Abuse Be Prosecuted Decades
After an Alleged Incident Occurred?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 42.
81. A recent computer search of major news sources containing the terms "repress"
and "memory" yielded 4,974 items published or released in the last two years. Search of
LEXIS, Nexis library, CURNEWS file (Mar. 1, 1995).
82. See, &g., Donn Fry, Controversial Memories: Three Authors Offer Reservations,
Support on Trusting Memory and the Theory of "Recovering" It, SEATTLE TiMES, Aug. 22,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP file ("Oprah, Geraldo and Sally Jessy
couldn't have come up with a more hotly contentious topic than 'recovered memory' if
they'd invented it.... [Tihe debate reached mass consumption through tabloid TV.").
A comparable phenomenon has occurred in media treatment of Parental Alienation
Syndrome, a theory propounded by Dr. Richard Gardner in self-published books and in-
court testimony claiming that "when children demonstrate ill, or even ambivalent, feelings
toward their fathers or report during divorce proceedings that their fathers abuse them, it
is most often the mother's doing." Wood, supra note 25, at 1367 (footnotes omitted).
Although this theory received some favorable media coverage, it was soundly refuted by
many psychological and legal experts in the area of child sexual abuse, albeit in profes-
sional journals, which are less likely to be read by the general public. Id. at 1373-74 &
nn.54-56, 1392.
83. See, e.g., Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio 1994) (holding discovery rule
applicable in repressed memory claim); id. at 875 (Wright, J., dissenting) (conceding that
memory can be repressed).
84. Id. at 875 (Wright, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
85. See, e.g., id. (Wright, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is sharp disagreement in the psychol-
ogy community as to whether a repressed memory actually can be retrieved and, if it can,
whether the memory is accurate."); Cheryl L. Karp, The Repressed Memory Controversy,
FAM. ADvoc., Winter 1995, at 70, 70 (referring to "enormous controversy about whether
... childhood memories can be fully retrieved in adulthood without major distortion").
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ories be retrieved? If so, how accurate are they? What are the best
methods for facilitating recollection? Can false memories be im-
planted? How can fantasy be distinguished from authentic recall?
Those who would close the courtroom doors to child sexual abuse
survivors and expert witnesses question the validity of repressed mem-
ory theory8 6 and claim that overzealous or negligent therapists im-
plant false memories.87 They cry "Witch hunt!" and accuse plaintiffs
and their supporters of wreaking havoc in previously happy families. 88
Those who campaign for legal reforms to recognize survivors' rights
argue that most recovered memories are authentic and a natural reac-
tion to trauma.8 9
Complicating the issue further is the undeniable fact-acknowl-
edged by both camps-that mental health malpractice does occur.90
For example, some therapists tell their patients that they are "re-
sisting" if they claim to have no memories of child sexual abuse and
that they must have been abused if they exhibit certain symptoms. 91
Although survivors "show significantly more depression, personality
disorders, substance abuse, phobias, and suicidal behaviors" than
86. See, eg., Gary Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words
of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129 (1993) (arguing for exclusion of repressed memory
evidence).
87. See infra part IV.A.2.
88. Wylie, supra note 36, at 18, 20 (relating anguished accounts of parents who claim
their children have falsely accused them of child sexual abuse); see also Michael Yapko,
The Seductions of Memory, FAM. THERAPY NETWORXER, SeptiOct. 1993, at 31, 33 ("Un-
covered memories... can tear families apart and engender economically ruinous legal
battles when survivors decide to take accused parties to court.").
89. One of the most active groups campaigning for survivors' rights is the American
Coalition for Abuse Awareness, based in Washington, D.C. Letter to Members from
Sherry A. Quirk, President, American Coalition for Abuse Awareness (Oct. 18, 1994) (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). It was formed in 1992 to unify the many
organizations, groups, and individuals involved in addressing the legal issues of child sexual
abuse throughout the United States. Id. Among its goals are the "enactment of federal
and state legislation establishing (1) the right of a child to be free from sexual victimization
and (2) appropriate protections to ensure that such victimization does not occur," the "en-
actment of federal and state legislation that extends or eliminates the statutes of limitations
relating to civil lawsuits brought by adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse," and the
establishment of "a national body to make policy recommendations on issues related to
childhood sexual abuse, the protection of children, and the rights of adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse." Id.
90. See, e.g., Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 8, passim (describing successful malprac-
tice suits brought against therapists by patients or accused parents).
91. Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
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adults who were not abused as children, "[n]one of these symptoms or
diagnoses.., are exclusive to having been abused." 92 Moreover,
proving psychological malpractice or negligence is never
easy. Demonstrating causation is complicated, because pa-
tients are troubled before they enter therapy, and juries must
struggle to distinguish old from new psychological injuries
Similarly, jurors may have difficulty identifying unpro-
fessional behavior. For example, treatment of acute appen-
dicitis is straightforward, while there are many accepted ways
to tackle schizophrenia.93
Without more, however, the occurrence of questionable thera-
peutic techniques is a poor reason to dismiss as "nonsense" all claims
and expert testimony relating to memory repression.94 Few would call
for the abolition of workers' compensation statutes merely because
fraudulent claims are occasionally filed. Neither is it likely that prod-
uct liability or medical malpractice litigation will be banished from the
courts because some suits are frivolous or unwarranted. As in any
other area of law, some claims are valid and some are not. It is, and
always has been, for the trier of fact to decide whether the plaintiff
presents a credible case.9'
D. Child Sexual Abuse Litigation Based on Repressed Memory
In a civil suit for child sexual abuse, the question is not whether
repressed memories are real or just a myth; there is scientific evidence
indicating that this phenomenon does in fact occur.9 6 Rather, the is-
sues are particularized and dependent on the procedural posture of
each case. For instance, at a pretrial motion for summary judgment or
dismissal, where the judge must decide whether the plaintiff's claim is
time barred, the question is: Was the plaintiff's memory of being sex-
ually abused truly repressed so that he or she could not reasonably
have been aware of the harm before the statute of limitations ex-
92. Donald Stolar, Ph.D., Letters to the 7Tunes: "Recovered Memories," L.A. TIMEs,
Dec. 18, 1993, at B7.
93. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 8, at 72.
94. See Butler, supra note 46, at 35 (citing corroborated story of incest survivor
Marilyn Van Derbur Atler and sociologist Linda Meyer Williams' study at University of
New Hampshire as proof that "some instances of recovered memory are credible"); infra
text accompanying notes 161-63 (discussing results of Williams' study).
95. See, e.g., 7 B.E. Wrricm, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 285, at 287 (3d ed. 1985) (stat-
ing that jurors are "the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses").
96. See infra part III.A.1-2.
[Vol. 28:1345
June 1995] EXPERT TESTIMONY ON REPRESSED MEMORY 1363
pired?97 At trial, the questions are: (1) Was the plaintiff sexually
abused as a child; and (2) was the defendant the perpetrator who
harmed the plaintiff?98
If the answer is yes at the pretrial motion, the plaintiff's claim
should be heard on its merits.99 If the answers are yes at trial, the
plaintiff should recover damages, the defendant should be held ac-
countable, and the defendant's family and community should be put
on notice so they can take precautions to protect their children.'00
1. Litigation from the survivor's perspective
Although some states have recognized survivors' right to legal re-
dress, survivors still face formidable obstacles.10 1 Many judges and
jurors share society's widespread skepticism about the validity of re-
pressed memory claims.0 2 This deep-rooted tendency to blame or
disbelieve the victim dates back at least a century.'
0 3
"In situations where it's a parent's word against an adult
daughter's, it may be easier to believe the adult who appears
to be a normal, upstanding citizen, compared with a dis-
traught woman in therapy. Perpetrators almost always look
better than victims because they are the ones dishing it out,
not the ones who are taking it."'1 4
97. See, e.g., Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990).
98. See, e.g., cases cited infra part IlI.B.2.
99. E.g., Nicolette v. Carey, 751 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (defendant's motion
for summary judgment denied); Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr.
605 (1990) (dismissal reversed); D.P. v. MJ.O., 640 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (dis-
missal reversed); Callahan, 464 N.W.2d 268 (summary judgment for defendant reversed);
Lemmerman v. Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal granted, 521 N.W.2d
14 (Mich. 1994) (summary disposition for defendant reversed); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d
18 (Nev. 1990) (dismissal reversed); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994) (lower
court's denial of motion to dismiss affirmed); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987) (summary judgment for defendant reversed).
100. See CRNiCH & CRNIcH, supra note 31, at 49 (noting that courts can issue protective
orders for children still under care of perpetrator).
101. At the outset, an attorney may decline to take a child sexual abuse case. Laura
Davis, Foreword to CRNicH & CRNucH, supra note 31, at vii ("Survivors... have been told
they didn't have enough proof.. . 'there's not enough chance of winning money to make
your case worthwhile' ... or that their abuse was 'too bizarre to be believed in court.' ").
102. See, e.g., Karp, supra note 85, at 71 ("Although there is greater awareness of sexual
abuse and domestic violence today, the tendency is still to doubt the victims and their
experiences and interpretations.").
103. See HERmAN, supra note 1, at 10-19.
104. Wylie, supra note 36, at 25 (quoting Richard Kluft, director of the Dissociative
Disorders Program at the Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital). Manifesting this inclination
to blame the victim, one Pennsylvania court refused to toll the accrual of a child sexual
abuse claim for insanity or incapacity because the plaintiff
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Additionally, a great deal of media attention has been directed
toward this topic in a variety of forms, including news reports, maga-
zine articles, documentaries, dramatizations, tabloid press, and tabloid
television. 5 Unfortunately, much of this coverage blurs the distinc-
tion between genuine claims and sensational stories that sell because
of their shock value. As a result, survivors often find their credibility
questioned by a public that confuses painful memories of childhood
abuse with fantastic claims of, for example, space alien abductions.
0 6
Perhaps the most effective deterrent to child sexual abuse litiga-
tion, aside from the financial expense of filing suit, is the emotional
price to be paid." 7 A survivor must be prepared to face experiences
similar to those of complainants in criminal prosecutions for rape-
"brutal cross-examination, interminable delays, insensitive attorneys,
abusers who [can] afford expensive lawyers and expert witnesses, or
legal loopholes and technicalities that invalidate[] their claim."'1 8
Furthermore, filing a claim of child sexual abuse may provoke a coun-
terclaim or other retaliation by the abuser.1 9 "Often, the first method
used by abusers when their acts are made public is psychological war-
fare. They may do anything from cajoling to promising reform to
threatening suit for defamation. [Plaintiffs] may even receive threats
of violence, either direct or indirect, to [themselves], supportive [fam-
ily] members ... and family pets.""10 Additional deterrents include an
does not allege that he was unaware of the actions at the time they occurred. He
concedes in fact that at the time of the incidents of abuse, he was aware that they
were occurring, that he found the incidents "frightening," and that they hurt, both
"physically" and "emotionally." He also testified that at the time the abuse oc-
curred, he "knew it was horrifying." He claims rather that he could not bring his
claim earlier, because he repressed the memory of the experiences. It was thus
plaintiff's own incapacity, albeit, one allegedly caused by the injury, and not the
nature of the injury itself that resulted in his inability to pursue his claim.
Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802,807-08 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 950 F.2d 721 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
105. See PENDERORAsT, supra note 79, at 455-56 ("In the world of infotainment, sex
abuse sells .... [Wie see [incest] constantly in our movies, soap operas, talk shows, news
broadcasts... books, newspapers and magazines .... ").
106. See, ag., id. at 134-35 (analogizing recovered memories of child sexual abuse to
hypnotic memories of UFO abductions); Jeanne McDowell, It Came from Outer Space,
Titan, Nov. 29, 1993, at 56, 56.
107. Davis, supra note 101, at vii.
108. Id.
109. CRNICH & CRNicH, supra note 31, at 57.
110. Id. at 52.
[Vol. 28:1345
June 1995] EXPERT TESTIMONY ON REPRESSED MEMORY 1365
inevitable loss of privacy 1' and changes in relationships with family
and friends.
Families under the stress of lawsuits often break down, even
when the suit is... against an outsider. When one family
member sues another, the results can be even more dra-
matie.... Family members not named in the suit may choose
sides, deciding to believe one member's story over another's.
If the perpetrator abused other family members, they may
side with the abuser out of their own denial... or because
they are still under the abuser's control and domination.
Other family members may decide to believe neither side
and contend that nothing is wrong, but that the victim merely
imagined the sexual abuse. Some family members may be-
come estranged from both sides. The survivor may also be
blamed for family disruptions caused by the lawsuit. One in-
cest survivor was told by one of her siblings that she was de-
stroying the careers of her siblings because "no one would
hire someone whose father was a pervert."
The revelations and stress caused by depositions and
trial testimony may cause other family members to remem-
ber their own abuse. This may produce extreme hostility and
anger toward the victim-anger at being forced to recall
events that they don't want to remember.1 1 2
Additional emotional trauma is bound to result if the survivor
loses the lawsuit. 3 Arguably, the repercussions are magnified in
child sexual abuse litigation due to the highly charged nature of the
accusations." 4 Despite the fallibility of judges and juries, most mem-
bers of the public-and maybe even the survivor-will perceive a ver-
dict as "the truth" and therefore disbelieve the plaintiff's claims."'
111. A plaintiff may face interrogatories, depositions, discovery requests for journals,
diaries, letters, or other recovery work, and questions at trial that deal with highly personal
information such as one's psychological and sexual life. Id.
112. Id. at 55-56 (noting possible adverse effects on plaintiff's relationships with spouse,
partner, or children).
113. Id. at 57; cf. Leslie Berkman, "I Was Really Hurt by the Verdict", L.A. TIMES, May
22, 1994, at A3 (reporting incest survivor Holly Ramona's reaction after her father won
malpractice suit against her therapists); Molly Fisk, Holly Ramona: Losing a Lawsuit, Yet
Keeping Her Self-Respect, HEALING WOMAN, Sept. 1994, at 3, 3 ("'After the verdict I had
a really hard time .... Part of me says, 'Just shut up and withdraw... because talking
doesn't get you anywhere.'" (quoting Holly Ramona)).
114. See CRNICH & CRNICH, supra note 31, at 14-16.
115. Id. at 57.
1366 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Moreover, a survivor may suffer further indignity by being forced to
pay damages for defamation.
116
In light of all the obstacles faced by abuse survivors who seek
legal redress, the admission of expert testimony to provide general
background information about repressed memory would not unfairly
tip the balance in favor of the plaintiff. Where repressed-memory
claims are based on authentic recollections of child sexual abuse, "the
law should not protect perpetrators who successfully traumatize their
victims into repression. 1
17
2. Litigation from the defendant's perspective
When legislatures extend statutes of limitations and courts apply
the discovery rule in child sexual abuse cases, defendants argue that
their right of repose 18 and reputational interests"' have been seri-
ously eroded. There can be no doubt about it: If a defendant has
been falsely accused, substantial damage is done to his or her name, n1 0
not to mention probable disruption to family life, career or business,
and physical or psychological health. Inevitably, some will be falsely
accused.' 2' However, this is a problem in all types of litigation-in-
cluding criminal cases where a defendant's liberty may be at stake.
122
Furthermore, contrary to the popular myth that it has become
"fashionable" to claim one was sexually abused as a child or that pa-
tients in therapy are simply looking for an easy answer and a scape-
goat for their problems, "therapists report that survivors tend to
116. Id.
117. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 86, at 145.
118. The policy rationale underlying all statutes of limitations is "to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
119. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized reputation as a liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975). "'Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing to him,' the minimal requirements of the Clause must be
satisfied." Id. at 574 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
120. See PENDERGRAST, supra note 79, at 13 (arguing that "[w]hen you are accused of
sexual abuse in our society... you are automatically presumed guilty unless proven inno-
cent beyond a shadow of a doubt"); infra part V.B.3.
121. But cf. Summit, supra note 25, at 190 ("Very few children, no more than two or
three per thousand, have ever been found to exaggerate or to invent claims of sexual
molestation.").
122. As one California court has stated, "[i]t is neither necessary nor justifiable to bar an
entire category of actions merely because the emotional nature of the injury may allow
some spurious claims to proceed further than would otherwise be possible." Evans, 216
Cal. App. 3d at 1617, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
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underestimate or deny the damage that has been done to them, even
while describing consciously remembered scenes of terrible
trauma."' 23 Nonetheless,
there is a low, growling undercurrent ... that alleged sex
abuse is just another handy excuse allowing spoiled kids to
evade adult responsibility for their own problems. More
than once it is suggested that the child abuse "industry" is
simply one more opportunistic infection feeding on the me-
tastasizing culture of victimization in America. 24
Alternatively, a defendant might argue that allowing expert testi-
mony on repressed memory would give the plaintiff an unfair advan-
tage at trial.'25 However, there is nothing to stop a defendant from
presenting an expert witness who will offer a contradictory opinion.' 26
3. Litigation from the therapist's perspective
Although some repressed memories of child sexual abuse surface
spontaneously, 27 therapists who work with survivors are finding
themselves drawn into the crossfire both in and out of court.'" Intim-
idation tactics have consisted of "threatening phone calls, pickets in
front of [therapists'] houses or offices, entrapment attempts, or legal
harassment."' 29 The highly publicized $475,000 verdict won by Cali-
fornian Gary Ramona in a malpractice suit against his daughter's ther-
123. Wylie, supra note 36, at 26-27.
The tendency to minimalize severe trauma to oneself, or even accept blame
for it, is ... related to the intense shame trauma victims feel-that they must have
been bad enough to deserve it.... Paradoxically, taking on the blame also gives
survivors a sense of meaning and control. To avoid feeling like inanimate, help-
less things, it is preferable to believe they did something that logically caused the
traumatic response.
Id at 27.
124. Id at 22.
125. See Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 62 (refer-
ring to "fear that juries might be improperly influenced by awe of scientific expertise to
subordinate their own judgment on a contested issue of ultimate fact to that of the
expert").
126. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 223-28.
127. See infra part III.A.4.
128. See HERMAN, supra note 1, at 9.
129. Herman Address, supra note 1, at 13.
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apists130 has encouraged other alleged abusers to file similar third-
party "retaliation" suits against therapists. 3'
Already this trend has had the salutary effect of alerting ther-
apists to the need for proper training and other precautions.' 32 If it
continues, however, it may eventually deter therapists from offering
much-needed help to abuse survivors. 33
4. Litigation from society's perspective
Civil suits for child sexual abuse may deter perpetrators who "fall
through the cracks" of the criminal justice system.134 If abusers are
not held accountable, they will continue to prey on children, 35 and
taxpayers will share the burden of therapy expenses, lost wages, lower
productivity, and generational cycles of abuse.
36
130. See Butler, supra note 46, at 12; see also Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, 602 N.E.2d 286
(Ohio 1991) (upholding jury malpractice award against therapist who mishandled plain-
tiff's recovered-memory therapy).
131. Ellen Alperstein, Prosecution Complex, L.A. TIms, Aug. 21, 1994, at 12, 12 (Mag-
azine) ("There are 8,000 to 10,000 lawsuits against therapists pending in U.S. courts.., and
at least 1,000 of them are in California.").
The outcome of the Ramona trial in California threatens to heighten psy-
chologists' vulnerability to claims they have contaminated the memories of cli-
ents. Not only the patient, but the spouse or family can now sue in court. It's also
"open season" for filing related complaints with state boards of psychology or
with an ethics committee of a state psychological association.
Introduction to Thomas F. Nagy, Guidelines & Direction When Treating Clients with Re-
pressed Memories, NAT'L PSYCHOLOGISr, July/Aug. 1994, at 8, 8.
According to one practicing psychologist, the Ramona decision has made many of his
colleagues nervous because third parties can now sue therapists. Stolar Interview, supra
note 79. They are "holding [their] breath to see how generalized it will get" and wondering
if courts will next allow third-pirty suits for wrongful death if a patient commits suicide.
Id.
132. See Nagy, supra note 131, at 8.
133. Wylie, supra note 36, at 29.
134. However, efforts are underway to fill in these "cracks." For example, California
has enacted legislation to reform the criminal statute of limitations for child sexual abuse.
Paula L. Boland & Sherry A. Quirk, Repressed Memories: Should Child Abuse Be Prose-
cuted Decades After an Alleged Incident Occurred? Yes: Victims May Need Time to Recog-
nize the Offense, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 42 (citing Act of Sept. 8, 1993, ch. 390, 1993 Cal.
Stat.).
135. See, e.g., Berliner, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that child sexual abuse offenders
"remain at risk to re-offend indefinitely" and "that recidivism still occurs as long as thirty
years later"); Andrew Vachss, Sex Predators Can't Be Saved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at
A15 (citing "survey that tracked released child molesters for 20 years [and] revealed a 43
percent recidivism rate regardless of [psychiatric] therapy").
136. See PENDERGRASr, supra note 79, at 506.
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On the other hand, the public bears the costs of litigation over
matters that necessarily involve thorny problems of proof. 137 In addi-
tion, the possibility that one can be unjustly held liable for child sexual
abuse may be so threatening to those who have constant contact with
children that they may consciously or unconsciously withdraw or re-
strict displays of affection.138 The loss of this contact is unfortunate,
because affection from parents, teachers, camp counselors, and the
like is totally appropriate and, indeed, necessary for children to
thrive.
1 39
5. Litigation from the courts' perspective
As in so many areas of the law where cherished rights clash, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to craft hard and fast rules that will do jus-
tice in every case. Consequently, in civil suits based on repressed
memories of child sexual abuse, courts should adopt a flexible case-
by-case approach that comports with the generally liberal view of ex-
pert testimony underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence.140
Unless and until genuine recovered memories can be reliably dis-
tinguished from false ones,' 4' expert testimony gives judges and jurors
a theoretical framework for the facts in a particular case. Judges who
are unfamiliar with the phenomenon of repressed memory will benefit
from this expert testimony when a defendant moves to dismiss on the
ground that the action is time barred. 42 Likewise, jurors might find it
helpful in deciding whether the allegations are true.' 43 On the other
hand, in some cases the prejudicial effect of admitting expert testi-
mony might outweigh its utility." In light of the arguments set forth
below, this Comment recommends a compromise solution: Allow ex-
137. Cf Stanley E. Rice, Note, Standing on Shaky Ground: The Supreme Court Curbs
Standing for Environmental Plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 38 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 199, 222-23 (1993) (predicting that high degree of proof required for standing "will
increase the cost of litigation").
138. See PENDERORAST, supra note 79, at 520.
139. For a summary of data relating to the harmful effects of inadequate physical affec-
tion on children, see James W. Prescott, Deprivation of Physical Affection as a Primary
Process in the Development of Physical Violence, in CriL ABusE AND VIoLENCE 66
(David G. Gil ed., 1979).
140. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993);
Margaret A. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach to an Expert's
Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 559, 565
(1989).
141. See Loftus, supra note 8, at 534.
142. See, eg., cases cited supra note 61.
143. See, e.g., cases cited infra part II.B.2.
144. See infra part IV.B2.
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pert evidence to the extent that it is helpful and exclude those aspects
of it that are unduly prejudicial or unreliable.
14-
III. "TRUE": Tim ARGUMENTS FOR RE-COGNrrION
OF REPRESSED MEMORY
A. Validity of Repressed Memory Theory
On one side of the debate are those who believe that there is a
reliable body of knowledge about the phenomenon of repressed mem-
oryY' 6 According to Dr. Judith L. Herman,
close-up exposure, especially early and prolonged exposure
to human cruelty, has a profound effect on memory. Distur-
bances of memory are cardinal symptoms of posttraumatic
stress disorder. They are found equally in the casualties of
war and political oppression.., and in the casualties of sex-
ual and domestic oppression .... These disturbances have
been difficult to comprehend because they are apparently
contradictory. On the one hand, traumatized people remem-
ber too much. On the other hand, they remember too lit-
tle.... The memories intrude when they are not wanted, in
the form of nightmares, flashbacks, and behavioral re-enact-
ments. Yet the memories may not be accessible when they
are wanted. Major parts of the story may be missing, and
sometimes an entire event or series of events may be lost.
1 47
This is not to say, however, that a particular survivor's memory is ac-
curate or reliable. As this Comment suggests, an expert witness
should not be allowed to express an opinion on this specific issue.148
1. Research findings
Experts are doing battle not only in courtrooms, but also in re-
search laboratories, professional journals, popular literature, and the
145. See infra part V.A.
146. See, e.g., Lenmerman v. Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Mich. 1993), appeal granted,
521 N.W.2d 14 (Mich. 1994) (noting "the present broad acknowledgment that child sexual
abuse can be suppressed"); Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio 1994) (Resnick, J.,
concurring) ("[S]ufficient scientific evidence verifies that incidents of repressed memory in
child sexual abuse cases do occur."); "Iyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 237 (Wash. 1986) (en
banc) (Pearson, J., dissenting) ("The policy behind [extending the discovery rule to adult
survivors] has been demonstrated: [T]he nature of child sexual abuse, according to exten-
sive expert commentary, is often so secretive, so humiliating, and so devastating that a
victim typically represses the events until the abuse is 'discovered' ......
147. Herman Address, supra note 1, at 3.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 403-05.
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mass media. 149 Countering the experiments that demonstrate the mal-
leability of memory5 0 is ongoing scientific research that strongly sug-
gests the validity of repressed memory theory.' 5 ' In one study of fifty-
three women who had self-reported histories of child sexual abuse,
sixty-four percent reported absent or incomplete memories of their
abuse at some point in the past.'52 Nine of twelve "who suffered
overtly violent abuse reported that they had been amnesic for these
experiences for a prolonged period of time.' 5 3 The researchers thus
found "a relationship ... between frankly violent or sadistic abuse
experiences and the resort to massive repression as a defense."' 54
Another study questioned 450 adult clients who had reported sex-
ual abuse at age sixteen or younger. 55 Of these, "267 subjects
(59.3%) identified some period in their lives, before age 18, when they
had no memory of their abuse."'5 6 The researchers reported that the
[v]ariables most predictive of abuse-related amnesia were
greater current psychological symptoms, molestation at an
early age, extended abuse, and variables reflecting especially
violent abuse (e.g., victimization by multiple perpetrators,
having been physically injured as a result of the abuse, victim
fears of death if she or he disclosed the abuse to others).5 7
Psychologist John Briere, co-author of this latter report, discussed
the limitations of both of these studies in that they rely on data from
retrospective self-reporting. 58 Although unable to "rule out the pos-
sibility that subjects' recall.., was not affected by other variables such
as passage of time, continuing memory impairment, current psycho-
logical distress or dysfunction [or] ... the possibility that subjects lied
or otherwise confabulated their abuse,'1 59 Briere writes:
The large (and relatively equal) percentage of subjects re-
porting some level of amnesia in each study.., appears to
149. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
150. See infra part IH.A.3.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 152-83.
152. Judith L. Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of Memories of
Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 1, 2-5 (1987).
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id.
155. John Briere & Jon Conte, Self-Reported Amnesia for Abuse in Adults Molested as
Children, 6 J. TRAUMATIC STRss 21, 23 (1993).
156. Id. at 21.
157. Id.
158. John Briere, Studying Delayed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, APSAC AD.
ViSOR, Summer 1992, at 17, 18.
159. Id.
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suggest either that abuse-related amnesia is a common,
"real" phenomenon, or that an unknown phenomenon of
major proportion caused more than half of 500+ women and
men to misrepresent their childhood histories. 160
Researcher Linda Meyer Williams avoided the limitations of self-
reporting subjects by interviewing 129 women seventeen years after
they had been brought as children to a hospital emergency room fol-
lowing documented sexual abuse.161 Of these women, thirty-eight
percent denied that they had been abused. 62 Although it is possible
they simply chose to keep the information private, "the questions put
to them at the time of the interview concerned equally intimate mate-
rial about their personal and sex lives that they did not hesitate to
answer fully."'
1 63
Another point of contention in the scientific debate questions the
logic of linking the results of experiments showing that false memories
can be implanted to the phenomenon of repressed memories of child
abuse.
"There is data to suggest that traumatic memory is physio-
logically encoded differently than normal memory.... [W]e
have to be very careful about drawing conclusions about
trauma memory from lab studies of ordinary memory, con-
ducted on nontraumatized volunteers, usually college stu-
dents who might be doing it for class credit, or getting paid.
We really cannot apply these experiments wholesale to the
issue of traumatic memory."'"
For example, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus cites as proof "for the
fact that it is possible to create false memories for childhood
events" 65 experiments in which she and her students successfully im-
planted false memories of being lost in a mall at the age of five or six
into the minds of adult subjects.'6 Critics, however, point to the ap-
160. Ia
161. Linda M. Williams, Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women's
Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167, 1170-73
(1994).
162. k
163. Mary S. Wylie, Trauma and Memory, FAM. TmRAPY NETWORKER, Sept./Oct.
1993, at 42, 42; see Williams, supra note 161, at 1170.
164. Wylie, supra note 36, at 27 (quoting Christine A. Courtois, Director of the Center
for Abuse Recovery and Empowerment in Washington, D.C.).
165. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 79, at 99.
166. Id at 97-99; Begley & Brant, supra note 3, at 68; Loftus, supra note 8, at 532;
Wylie, supra note 163, at 42.
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pies-and-oranges problem of likening these experiments to memories
of child sexual abuse.
167
The memory-real or implanted-of being lost in a mall
once as a child... would.... have less far-reaching life conse-
quences than being repeatedly beaten and raped by one's fa-
ther. Profound terror, grief, isolation and pain.., have a
tremendous impact on long-term emotional, cognitive and
even physiological functioning .... And extreme and/or
chronic trauma is believed to have peculiar effects on mem-
ory not obtainable under any imaginable (not to mention
ethical) laboratory conditions; obviously, truly traumatic
events cannot be staged with human subjects to prove the
impact of trauma on memory.'
68
According to Harvard researcher Bessel Van Der Kolk, "chronic,
severe childhood trauma may permanently alter the neurobiology that
integrates cognitive memory and emotional arousal.' 1 6 9 This theory
focuses on the limbic system of the brain, which functions to assemble
the fragments of memory scattered into the auditory cortex (sounds),
visual cortex (appearance), sensory cortex (touch), and olfactory cor-
tex (taste and smell).170 "[W]hen a child is continually exposed to
trauma, the operation of the limbic system.., is sharply and chroni-
cally disrupted. The brain is so overwhelmed, so many times, by nega-
tive stimulation and arousal that it cannot accommodate and integrate
all the information it is receiving.' 171 This severing of memory and
emotion helps explain why some survivors experience flashbacks and
body memories unaccompanied by conscious recollections-phenom-
ena which skeptics find hard to believe.172
2. Related research on traumatic amnesia
Scientists' efforts to understand other types of traumatic amnesia
appear to lend support to studies that have focused primarily on re-
pressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. Experiments with lab
animals confirm that hyperarousal caused by terror has an impact on
167. Wylie, supra note 163, at 43.
168. Id
169. Id
170. See Begley & Brant, supra note 3, at 68-69.
171. Wylie, supra note 163, at 43.
172. Id.; see, eg., infra text accompanying note 180.
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memory storage.173 Research by Roger Pitman at Manchester Veter-
ans Administration Hospital "demonstrate[s] that activation of
trauma-specific memories in combat veterans with PTSD [that is,
posttraumatic stress disorder] produces highly elevated physiologic re-
sponses that fail to extinguish, even over periods of half a lifetime."'174
Through experiments in abnormal memory retrieval at Yale Univer-
sity, John Krystal was able to induce flashbacks in combat veterans
diagnosed with PTSD but could not induce them in veterans who did
not have PTSD.175
Studies of civilian disasters by David Spiegel at Stanford Univer-
sity show that "people who spontaneously dissociate at the time of the
traumatic event are the most vulnerable to develop symptoms of
PTSD, including.., disturbances of memory retrieval, intrusive recall,
and amnesia."'1 76 In her New York University doctoral dissertation,
Danya Vardi has shown "deficits on a number of measures of autobio-
graphical memory in incest survivors, deficits that were not evident in
rape survivors or normal control subjects.' 77 Richard McNally of
Harvard University interviewed subjects and observed that
combat veterans with PTSD have difficulty retrieving, spe-
cific autobiographical memories on cue, especially after be-
ing exposed to a combat videotape. . . . [T]he men who
showed the greatest disturbances in autobiographical mem-
ory were those who still dressed in combat regalia twenty
years after the war. These men remembered nothing in
words and everything in action.
71
In Lenore Terr's clinical study of twenty children with docu-
mented histories of preschool trauma, none could verbally describe
events that occurred before they were twenty-eight months old.17 9
Nevertheless, these experiences were indelibly encoded in
memory and expressed nonverbally as symptoms. Eighteen
of the twenty children showed evidence of traumatic mem-
ory in their behavior and their play. They had specific fears
and somatic symptoms related to the traumatic events, and
173. Herman Address, supra note 1, at 4 ("[H]igh levels of circulating catacholamines
result in enhanced learning that stubbornly resists subsequent extinction. This is an animal
analogue.., of the indelible imprint of traumatic events on memory.").
174. L
175. 1d. at 5.
176. I&
177. 1 at 5-6.
178. Id. at 6.
179. TERR, supra note 79, at 181-82.
[Vol. 28:1345
June 1995] EXPERT TESTIMONY ON REPRESSED MEMORY 1375
they re-enacted these events in their play with extraordinary
accuracy. A child who had been sexually molested by a ba-
bysitter in the first two years of life could not, at age five,
remember ... being abused, but in his play he repeatedly
enacted scenes that exactly replicated the pornographic
movie made by the babysitter.180
Terr concluded from this study that the nature of the trauma may in-
fluence the child's ability to remember it.' 8 ' The children in Terr's
study were more likely to remember short, one-time events than long,
repeated ordeals.'8 In addition, the longer and more frequent the
abuse, the less accurate the memories.'8 3
3. The experience of clinicians
Despite increasing criticism of the mental health profession in
general and a rise in malpractice suits against particular therapists, cli-
nicians who specialize in the treatment of adult survivors of child sex-
ual abuse steadfastly attest to the authenticity of the recovered
memories. For these therapists, "[t]he unendurable and impossible-
to-fake agony of the clients is the most powerful evidence for the truth
of their experiences."'184 As one writer notes, "the severity and com-
plexity of [clients'] pathology and the palpable quality of their pain
makes an extraordinary impression on even initially skeptical
therapists."' 85
Although therapists' observations are vulnerable to the criticism
that they are merely anecdotal and unproven by scientific methods,
some laboratory researchers point to "the need for integrating clinical
data in experimental research."'186 This need arises due to the ex-
treme levels of emotional pain exhibited by survivors in therapy,
which is "not ethically reproducible in mood and memory
experimentation."' 87
Symptoms vary depending on several factors, including the age of
the child at the time of abuse, the length of time the child was abused,
the child's relationship to the perpetrator, and how the family re-
180. Herman Address, supra note 1, at 6; see TERR, supra note 79, at 248-51.
181. TERR, supra note 79, at 182-83.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 183.
184. Wylie, supra note 36, at 26.
185. Id.
186. Jean L. Yates & William Nasby, Dissociation, Affect, and Network Models of Mem-
ory: An Integrative Proposal, 6 J. TRAUMATIC STREss 305, 306 (1993).
187. Id. at 305.
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sponded if the child tried to disclose.188 Dissociative responses to
terror can occur spontaneously in some people, while others "may
learn to induce this state voluntarily, especially if they are exposed to
traumatic events over and over. [For example,] [p]olitical prisoners
instruct one another in simple self-hypnosis techniques in order to
withstand torture."'1 89 According to Dr. Herman,
In my clinical work with incest survivors, again and again I
have heard how as children they taught themselves how to
enter a trance state.... [I]f you ask survivors, "What did you
do while the actual assault was taking place?" they will say,
"Well, there was a little crack on the ceiling, and I focused
my vision on that," .... "I learned how I could leave my
body and float up onto the ceiling and watch what was going
[on] with a sense of detached calm. I felt very sorry for that
little girl on the bed who was being raped, but it wasn't
me."19
0
Nevertheless, researchers on this side of the debate do acknowl-
edge the possibility that some patients' memories might be false.19'
Where that is the case, they advise therapists that "deluded or mislead
[sic] individuals should be disabused of their confusion lest they
falsely accuse innocent people and/or waste precious time and re-
sources on unnecessary treatment."19 Clinicians must keep in mind
that, although survivors do show a certain constellation of symptoms,
those symptoms are not exclusive to having been abused.19 3 As one
therapist put it, "There are such things as repressed memories, but bad
therapists tell clients they're resisting by not having any memories and
that they were necessarily abused if they had certain symptoms."'
94
4. Spontaneous recall
Many recovered memories are not triggered by therapy, hypno-
sis, sodium amytal, or sodium pentothal. 195 Thus, it follows that the
188. Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
189. Herman Address, supra note 1, at 4.
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. See, e.g., Briere, supra note 158, at 17.
192. Id
193. Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Hewczuk v. Sambor, No. 91-6562; 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2417, at *2-3
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1993) (plaintiff's near-drowning while swimming triggered vague feeling
of having experienced similar trauma; evidence later established that during childhood
plaintiff's foster parents nearly drowned her by holding her face under water in toilet
bowl); McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463, 465 (Me. 1994) (plaintiff alleged he repressed all
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theory of false memory implantation by therapists does not explain all
cases of survivors whose memories of child sexual abuse surface in
adulthood. As one author said, "If such memories were induced only
by pesky therapists, survivors ... would not spontaneously recover
them outside therapy. But they do."' 96
Documented examples include John Robitaille of Providence,
Rhode Island, who, upon hearing a radio report about the arrest of a
priest on charges of child molestation, suddenly recalled having been
sexually abused by that same priest when he was eleven years old.19 7
Los Angeles attorney Shari Karney, who helped lead the campaign for
California's extended statute of limitations for child sexual abuse, 98
experienced her first flashback of incest while cross-examining a man
who had been accused of molesting his daughter in a child custody
case.199 Insurance adjuster Frank Fitzpatrick remembered being mo-
lested as a child by Father James Porter while he was lying in bed
feeling an unexplainable anguish.200
Brown University ethics professor Ross Cheit began to retrieve
his lost memories when he learned that his nephew was about to join a
boys chorus of which Cheit had been a member.20 '
Though he' could not yet name the reason, Cheit felt
sickened by the news-and gradually began sinking into a
bewildering depression. He didn't link it to the phone call;
indeed, he blamed anything and everything else for what his
wife... now calls "the months Ross lost his mind." [A few
months later,] while on vacation, he had something like a
dream.
He woke with the baffling sense that a man he had not
seen or thought of in 25 years was powerfully present in the
room. William Farmer had been the administrator of the San
Francisco Boys Chorus summer camp, which Cheit had at-
memories of sexual abuse until "he saw a television report that [defendant] had been
charged with sexually abusing other persons").
196. Calof, supra note 36, at 42.
197. Id.
198. See Kathryn Bold, Solid Support After "Shattered Trust," L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1994,
at E2; Letter from Shari L. Karney, Esq. to Friends (Jan. 29, 1994) (on file with Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review).
199. Bold, supra note 198, at E2; Calof, supra note 36, at 42.
200. Miriam Horn, Memories Lost and Found, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 29,
1993, at 52, 54. "When Fitzpatrick went public with his suit against... Porter, several of
the nearly 100 Porter victims who came forward said they remembered only when they
heard about the case on the news." Id.
201. Id. at 52.
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tended in the late '60s between the ages of 10 and 13. Cheit
could picture him clearly-the big stomach and bent shoul-
ders, the round head, wispy hair. Over the course of the day,
he recalled still more. How Farmer would enter his cabin
night after night, just as the boys were going to sleep. How
he would sit on Cheit's bed, stroking the boy's chest and
stomach while he urged him in a whisper to relax, relax. "I
was frozen," says Cheit. "My stomach clenched against his
touch. And then he would slowly bring his hand into my
pants. 2 o2
In his subsequent search for Farmer, Cheit found corroborating
evidence for his memories when he visited Madi Bacon, the founder
of the chorus, who admitted that she almost fired Farmer once "for
what she called 'hobnobbing' with one of the boys. '20 3 Bacon later
denied knowing anything about Farmer's alleged crimes.2 4 Upon
hearing that Cheit had filed a suit against the chorus, Bacon re-
sponded, "'I don't see what good it's going to do for a young man
with a family to be known publicly as having been abused. I mean it's
such bad taste.' 205
When Cheit finally found Farmer in Oregon and called him there,
Farmer admitted the molestation and said that he had lost jobs and
left California because of "it," but balked when Cheit suggested that
he register as a sex offender.20 6 Eventually, the San Francisco Boys
Chorus settled, agreeing to apologize and pay $35,000.207 However,
Farmer still faces criminal charges and Cheit's continuing civil lawsuit
against him.208
B. Arguments in Favor of Admitting Expert Testimony
While mental health professionals continue their research into re-
pressed memory, the courts must confront the difficulties of adjudicat-
ing present child sexual abuse claims now-before science is able to
provide additional answers to pressing questions. As an initial matter,
survivors can claim that the validity of the theory is already implicitly
recognized by those jurisdictions that have enacted extended statutes
202. Id.
203. Id. at 56.
204. Id.
205. I1& at 60.
206. Id- at 62.
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of limitations and have applied the discovery rule to survivors' suits."°
Practically speaking, however, the arguments for admissibility do not
end there.
1. Fundamental fairness and the right to redress
In response to a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss a claim for
child sexual abuse based on repressed memory, a plaintiff will attempt
to persuade the judge that fundamental fairness and the right to re-
dress outweigh the underlying purposes of statutes of limitations.
2 10
Many courts have recognized that in cases where an injured party
does not know or cannot be expected to know of an injury until long
after the statute of limitations has expired, it is unfair to automatically
foreclose that person's cause of action.2 ' In a case where the plaintiff
had repressed memories of sexual abuse for fifty years-abuse which
her father admitted committing when she confronted him as an
adult-the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
[I]f plaintiff's allegations are well based, defendants had sole
control over the facts giving rise both to plaintiff's cause of
action and her repression of it. Moreover, to protect parents
or relatives at the expense of the children works an intolerable
perversion of justice. Finally, we believe that it will not en-
courage the wholesale filing of fraudulent claims to allow this
plaintiff to bring a lawsuit at age fifty-four as opposed to age
eighteen.212
However, in Tyson v. Tyson,213 the Washington Supreme Court
held the discovery rule inapplicable in a father-daughter incest case.2"4
209. See, e.g., Lemmerman v. Fealk, 507 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), appeal
granted, 521 N.W.2d 14 (Mich. 1994); ABC & XYZ v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneap-
olis, 513 N.W.2d 482,485-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Herald v. Hood, No. 15986, 1993 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3688, at *2-4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 21, 1993).
210. See Lemmerman, 507 N.W.2d at 230 (reversing summaryjudgment for defendants).
In holding the discovery rule applicable to the 54-year-old plaintiff's claim for child sexual
abuse, the court rejected the contention that corroborating evidence should be required.
Id. at 229. "Mandating corroboration is inconsistent with the history of the [discovery]
rule's application.... A plaintiff should not be denied the benefit of the rule on the basis
that he or she would have difficulty proving his or her case." d; accord McCollum v.
D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797, 799 (N.H. 1994).
211. See, e.g., Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 635-36 (Wash. 1969).
212. Lemmerman, 507 N.W.2d at 230 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
213. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340
(West Supp. 1995).
214. Id. at 230.
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In an eloquent dissent-later vindicated when the majority's holding
was superseded by statute2 15-Judge Pearson observed:
[I]t is the sexual abusers of children who have had full
knowledge, throughout the statutory period, that their ac-
tions constituted sexual abuse. The victims, as children,
could not have had full knowledge of the wrongfulness of
their abusers' acts and, in particular, the permanent damages
that result .... The purpose behind extending the discovery
rule to adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse is not to
provide a guaranteed remedy to such plaintiffs. The purpose
is to provide an opportunity for an adult.., to prove not
only that she was abused and that the defendant was her
abuser, but that her suffering was such that she did not and
could not reasonably have discovered all the elements of her
cause of action at an earlier time.2 1 6
Thus, if a judge is unfamiliar with the theory of repressed mem-
ory, expert testimony can provide insight for deciding whether to ap-
ply the discovery rule.217 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted in a
repressed memory case, "We do not mean that expert testimony from
a treating psychotherapist would actually validate a plaintiff's claim of
past sexual abuse. But... expert testimony by a mental health profes-
sional would aid the trier of law in determining whether the plaintiff is
entitled to invoke the discovery rule. '218
Judges may also benefit from expert testimony in deciding
whether to toll the statute of limitations for disabilities such as in-
sanity or fraudulent concealment. 1 9 One court recognized this when
it remanded a case so that the plaintiff could submit "affidavits or dep-
ositions of qualified witnesses providing expert opinion to support the
scientific validity of repressed memory and to establish that her nor-
mal powers of perception and recollection had been obscured by the
phenomenon as a result of her father's sexual acts with her. '220 The
court felt it needed further factual support to decide whether genuine
215. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1995).
216. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 236-37 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
217. See, eg., Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990) (citing to plaintiff's
affidavits "furnished by experts [which] discussed the phenomenon of repression by child
sex abuse victims").
218. Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 631 (Okla. 1992).
219. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (sum-
marizing affidavit of psychiatrist who examined plaintiff).
220. Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246, 252-53 (Ind. 1993).
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issues remained for trial on the question of whether the statute of lim-
itations could be tolled for fraudulent concealment.221
2. Case precedent for admitting expert testimony at trial
When repressed memory claims actually have made it to trial,
two scenarios are typical: (1) the plaintiff offers expert evidence, and
the defendant objects;' or (2) both parties call expert witnesses to
the stand.223 Courts have admitted expert testimony on repressed
memory in both civil and criminal cases. When Gary Ramona sued
his daughter's therapists, claiming that they had "implanted" Holly
Ramona's memories of abuse,' 4 Dr. Lenore Terr testified for the de-
fendants,22 and Dr. Park Dietz and Dr. Elizabeth Loftus testified for
the plaintiff.226 In the 1990 California murder trial of George Frank-
lin,2 7 the defense called psychologist Elizabeth Loftus to the stand to
provide counterpoint to Dr. Terr's testimony for the prosecution. 228 A
federal judge in Massachusetts allowed expert testimony in a case
where the plaintiff had repressed her memory of traumatic strip
searches by a Plymouth County sheriff.229 In another case, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in permit-
ting a psychiatrist to testify and affirmed the defendant's murder
conviction 3
The case that goes most directly to the issue raised in this Com-
ment is Herald v. Hood."' In Herald, the defendant appealed a jury
verdict awarding his niece $150,000 in compensatory damages and $5
221. Id. at 253.
222. See, eg., Hewczuk v. Sambor, No. 91-6562, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2417, at *4-6
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1993).
223. See Butler, supra note 46, at 34.
224. See ida; supra text accompanying notes 46, 130.
225. See Butler, supra note 46, at 34.
226. See id.; Herman Address, supra note 1, at 19. In the question-and-answer session
after Herman's speech, Terr and Dietz discussed the Ramona verdict. Id at 19-20.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
228. LoFrus & KErCHAM, supra note 79, at 40-49, 56.
229. Cole v. Snow, 586 F. Supp. 655, 667 (D. Mass. 1984) (awarding plaintiff $27,040 for
future medical costs and $150,000 "for the emotional and physical consequences of these
unjustified strip searches").
230. People v. Fisher, 423 N.E.2d 53, 54 (N.Y. 1981). The court explained:
This witness' opinion did not go directly to the issue of the truth or falsity of [the
eyewitness'] story. In essence, it went to explain, with reasonable medical cer-
tainty, that it was possible for an individual to initially unconsciously block out
certain facts or feelings... which follow in the train of a traumatic event, but to
recall them at a later time.
Id.
231. No. 15986, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3688, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 21, 1993).
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million in punitive damages-reduced by the trial court to $2.5 mil-
lion.232 Julie Herald had repressed memories of the sexual abuse she
suffered from ages three to fifteen. 3 Herald had confronted Dennis
Hood with the allegations when she recovered her memories fifteen
years later; in response, Hood "indicated in telephone conversations
that she was 'the only one' he had ever molested[,] ... then met with
Julie Herald at her therapist's office and, according to two witnesses,
admitted he had sexually abused her.' '234 Nevertheless, Hood denied
the allegations at trial?3-5 On appeal, Hood asserted fourteen assign-
ments of error, three of which involved the issue of expert testi-
mony.36 The court held: (1) the trial court neither abused its
discretion nor prejudiced the defendant when it allowed a licensed
professional counselor with extensive experience in sex abuse counsel-
ing to testify "regarding the existence of the psychological phenome-
non of 'repression' ,;237 (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in permitting expert opinions embracing the ultimate issue to be de-
cided by the jury-that is, that the plaintiff was sexually abused as a
child;2 8 and (3) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when
it allowed the plaintiff's counselor to testify, despite her having ob-
tained knowledge in privileged group therapy sessions." 9
A case with similar results is Hewczuk v. Sambor,240 in which a
district court judge denied the defendants' renewed motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law and their alternative motion for a new trial.241
In Hewczuk the plaintiff had sued her foster parents for physical and
sexual abuse, the memories of which she had suppressed for thirty
years.242
232. Id. at *1-2.
233. Id. at *2.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *16-20.
237. Id. at *16-18. The defendant nonetheless objected because the expert was not a
licensed psychologist but had made a psychological diagnosis. Id.
238. Id. at *18-19. Ohio Evidence Rule 704, providing that "[tlestimony in the form of
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact," is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence
704. Omo R. EVID. 704.
239. Herald, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3688 at *20 ("[A]n expert witness is capable of
disregarding information obtained in a privileged situation and testifying only on the basis
of non-privileged facts and information.").
240. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2417 at *6.
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id. at *2.
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[T]he trial evidence established that, while in defendants'
foster care... in early 1960, plaintiff was horribly mistreated
(forced to eat her own vomit and drink her own urine;
smeared with fecal matter and forced to eat it; bathed in ex-
tremely hot water; nearly drowned .when her face was held
under water in a toilet bowl; and, on at least one occasion,
sexually assaulted); and that her memory of these atrocities
was suppressed [until] she had begun to have "flashbacks"
and partial awareness of the earlier trauma in the summer of
1990.243
Initially, the defendants argued that Joan Hewczuk's claim was barred
by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations, but the judge ruled
that the question of when the claim accrued was for the jury to de-
cide 2" At trial a medical witness testified as to "the existence and
duration of plaintiff's repression of memory."245 The court found that
this testimony "was plainly relevant to the limitations issues, and the
jury was properly instructed that they could consider it."' 2 4 6
3. Plaintiff's handicaps in meeting the burden of proof
Concern over the danger of survivor litigation flooding the courts
ignores reality. In addition to the emotional and financial difficulties
of bringing suit,247 plaintiffs who go to trial must overcome severe
handicaps in meeting the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.248 Like child victims of sexual abuse, adult survivors often
are hampered by the lack of corroborating evidence in the form of
eyewitnesses to the perpetrator's acts249 or documentation of physical
243. Id.
244. Id. at *1.
245. Id. at *6.
246. Id. "On the basis of the testimony of plaintiff's expert, the jury could properly find
that one of the consequences of the childhood trauma inflicted by the defendants was the
suppression of plaintiff's memories of these events." Id. at *4.
247. See supra part II.D.1. Generally, courts have been unwilling to postpone accrual of
child sexual abuse actions merely because the emotional difficulties inherent in this type of
case prevented plaintiff from filing a timely complaint. David A. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
App. 4th 281,288, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 542 (1993), review denied, No. S037126, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 821 (Cal. Feb. 24, 1994).
248. The preponderance of evidence standard of proof in civil cases is "evidence which
is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to
it." BLAc's LAW DIcTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990).
249. See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 402 (Mich. 1990) ("In most criminal
sexual conduct cases there are no nonparticipant witnesses to the crime, which reduces the
cases to weighing the defendant's credibility against that of the victim's.").
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injuries. 50 More likely than not the defendant will deny the allega-
tions and do everything possible to discount the plaintiff's testi-
mony.5 Oftentimes family members and friends who might have
helpful information are unwilling to testify.2 52 Just as "[t]he perceived
inherent weakness of these cases, which often pitted a young trauma-
tized child against a seemingly respectable adult, caused many prose-
cutors to bolster their cases with expert testimony, ' '1 53 adult plaintiffs
also may proffer expert witnesses to support their claims.254 For both
child and adult victims, "[tihe implication that the victim imagined or
fantasized the sexual abuse is an undercurrent in every case .... Ex-
pert witnesses are needed in this area not to render opinions as to
whether a [victim] is telling the truth but to... counter the implicit
defense of fabrication or imagination. '255 In fact, the need may be
even greater for adult plaintiffs. The mere passage of time exacer-
bates the difficulty of finding physical evidence and corroborating lay
witnesses.2 6 In addition, because children naturally appear more "in-
nocent" and vulnerable, jurors may be less sympathetic to adult plain-
tiffs, particularly since defendants usually enter the courtroom as
nonthreatening senior citizensl 7-hardly the stereotypical image of a
child molester. 58
250. See, e.g., id. ("[G]iven the fact that disclosure in child sexual abuse cases is gener-
ally delayed because of coercion, guilt, or some other reason, there will be no physical
evidence to corroborate the victim's allegations.").
251. See CRNICH & CRNICH, supra note 31, at 11; see also Karp, supra note 85, at 71
(reporting research finding "that many individuals who had previously acknowledged their
violent or abusive behavior now carry around articles on false memory to fuel new deni-
als-and thus be in a position to continue their perpetrations").
252. See CRNICH & CR icH, supra note 31, at 14-16.
253. Rebecca J. Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 97, 97 (1985).
254. See, e.g., Hewczuk v. Sambor, No. 91-6562, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2417, at *4-6
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1993); Herald v. Hood, No. 15986, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3688, at *16-
20 (Ohio Ct. App. July 21, 1993).
255. Roe, supra note 253, at 105 (emphasis added).
256. See supra note 118 (discussing loss of evidence, memories, and witnesses over time
as policy rationale for statutes of limitations).
257. See Wylie, supra note 36, at 20 (describing alleged perpetrators as "parents in their
late fifties, sixties and seventies").
258. See Rosy A. Ekpenyong, Book Review, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 571
(1988) (reviewing SETH L. GOLDSTEIN, THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ASSESSMENT, INVESTIGATION, AND INTERVENTION (1987)) (refer-
ring to "the myth of the offender as a solo sex fiend and a poor, depraved, scar-faced
stranger who waits in the bushes for young prey"). Contrary to what most people imagine,
child molesters can be "apparently normal adults," see Summit, supra note 25, at 190, "well
educated," see Myers et al., supra note 8, at 130, and "middle- or upper-class[,] . . .
respected professionals," Fahn, supra note 25, at 205-06.
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4. Satisfying the requirements for expert testimony under the
Federal Rules of Evidence
The policy underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) gen-
erally favors the admission of expert opinions.259 If expert testimony
in repressed memory cases is subject to the limitations proposed in
this Comment2 60 it can satisfy all of the specific FRE requirements
applicable to expert evidence.26'
Assuming that the witness is qualified as an expert,262 the chief
requirement for the admission of expert testimony is that it "assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue."263 This requirement is met in repressed memory cases because
"[w]hen middle-aged plaintiffs make allegations of childhood sexual
abuse, jurors are likely to be puzzled over the delay in filing suit.
Many will question how the plaintiff could have 'forgotten' being sex-
ually victimized as a child.
'264
The main purpose of allowing expert testimony in repressed
memory litigation is analogous to the rationale for using expert testi-
mony in child sexual abuse prosecutions. Several courts have recog-
nized that "[a child's] reactions to a sexual assault, especially if the
assailant is a family member, are unique to the particular crime. This
uniqueness puts the evidence beyond the jury's ability to properly
evaluate the facts in issue absent expert testimony.' '265 Affrming this
259. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993)
(referring to "the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their 'general
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony'" (quoting Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988))); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence:
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REv. 879, 888 (1982); Myers et al.,
supra note 8, at 6.
260. See nfra part V.A.
261. The FRE's threshold requirement for all types of evidence is relevancy. FED. R.
Evm. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). "Relevant evidence" is
defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any [material] fact
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
Expert testimony is relevant in a repressed memory suit because it has a tendency to prove
that the plaintiff may have suffered amnesia as a result of child sexual abuse.
262. See infra text accompanying notes 408-12.
263. FED. R. Evm. 702.
264. Kanovitz, supra note 11, at 1203.
265. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 401; see also State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn.
1984) (finding that assessment of child victim's credibility in sexual abuse case was out of
jury's common experience); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Or. 1983) (relying on
voir dire responses to support conclusion that average individual is unfamiliar with emo-
tional trauma associated with sexual assault). Without expert testimony, "jurors may im-
pose standards of normalcy on child victim/witnesses who consistently respond in distinctly
abnormal fashion." Id. at 1222 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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view, the American Bar Association's National Legal Resource
Center for Child Advocacy and Protection has reported that
[t]he characteristics and dynamics of child sexual abuse are
areas about which most jurors do not have general knowl-
edge. If anything, the average layperson's perceptions re-
garding... child sexual abuse are based upon myth and
emotional reactions. In fact, the family dynamics which give
rise to sexual abuse of a child are often complex and contrary
to these common perceptions.
... Only people who have worked intensively with in-
cestuous families possess the specialized knowledge of the
characteristics and dynamics of child sexual abuse.266
Under common law, expert opinions are admissible only on mat-
ters that are not common knowledge.267 Using this stricter test, one
might argue that expert testimony regarding repressed memory
should be inadmissible. However, the drafters of the FRE eliminated
this requirement,26 concluding that
the jury can also benefit from expert testimony on subjects
with which it has a degree of familiarity.... In some cases,
the expert can add insight and depth to the jury's under-
standing of familiar subjects. In others, expert testimony
may disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about
relatively common events .... The question is not whether
the subject is beyond common understanding, but whether
the expert can assist the jury .... 269
Moreover, even as media reports and portrayals of repressed
memory-some more accurate than others-reach a wider audience,
expert evidence still should be admissible because it assists the trier of
266. Lucy Berliner et al., Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of Intra-Family Child Sex-
ual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW
166, 169-70 (Josephine Bulkley ed., 1982).
267. "[T]he subject matter must be closely related to a particular profession, business or
science and not within the common knowledge of the average layman." Bridger v. Union
Ry., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966).
268. See FED. R. Evn. 702; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 1313, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that Rule 702 "thus expands slightly the
practice of most jurisdictions of permitting expert testimony only when the subject matter
was otherwise beyond lay comprehension").
269. Myers et al., supra note 8, at 7.
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fact. 70 This is especially true in light of the many commonly held
myths about children27 ' and biases against victims of sexual assault.272
There is abundant documentation of society's distrust of rape
complainants.273 As Dr. Judith L. Herman observed in her study of
psychological trauma:
It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator.
All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing. He
appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no
evil. The victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share
the burden of pain. The victim demands action, engagement,
and remembering....
...Throughout the history of the field, dispute has
raged over whether patients with posttraumatic conditions
are entitled to care and respect or deserving of contempt,
whether they are genuinely suffering or malingering, whether
their histories are true or false and, if false, whether
imagined or maliciously fabricated. In spite of a vast litera-
ture documenting the phenomenon of psychological trauma,
debate still centers on the basic question of whether these
phenomena are credible and real.2 74
Courts have noted skepticism of child complainants "because of a
child's susceptibility to external influences" 275 and the common mis-
270. FED. R. EVID. 702. The advisory committee's note to Rule 702 states in pertinent
part:
Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be
determined on the basis of assisting the trier. "There is no more certain test for
determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether
the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best
possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a
specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute." When opinions
are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a
waste of time.
FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note (citation omitted) (quoting Mason Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAn. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952)).
271. See infra text accompanying notes 275-79, 282-83.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 102-04; infra textaccompanying notes 273-
74.
273. See, e.g., Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 402; HERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-8, 115-17; Com-
ment, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1661-63
(1984).
274. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-8.
275. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 402.
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perceptions that children fantasize about sexual acts;276 that children
will report injuries immediately,277 fully,278 and consistently;279 that
sex offenders are always strangers;" that physical injury almost al-
ways results from sexual abuse;281 that child victims show fear, anger,
276. See, e.g., id (noting prevalence of view that children fantasize about sexual acts).
277. See, e.g., People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 394, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 891
(1988) ("[A]n expert could testify that.., delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the
secretive environment often created by an abuser... ."), review denied, No. S007116, 1988
Cal. LEXIS 614 (Cal. Nov. 10, 1988); People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577, 199
Cal. Rptr. 796, 804 (1984) (upholding admission of expert testimony that "a sexually mo-
lested child finds it quite difficult to talk about sexual indiscretions with an adult"); Smith
v. State, 688 P.2d 326,327 (Nev. 1984) (holding expert evidence admissible in prosecution's
rebuttal after defense cross-examined victim about reporting delays); State v. Petrich, 683
P.2d 173, 176, 180 (Wash. 1984) (admitting social worker's testimony on correlation be-
tween length of reporting delays and relationship of parties-that is, delay is longest when
victim knows defendant).
There are numerous reasons for delayed allegations of abuse, including secrecy, help-
lessness, entrapment, and accommodation. See Summit, supra note 25, at 181-86. Chil-
dren may not disclose abuse until they perceive an opportunity to do so or a greater
likelihood that they will be believed, such as when the abuser moves out of the family's
residence or, because parents have divorced, the children no longer feel a responsibility to
keep the family together. Fahn, supra note 25, at 203; Kathleen C. Faller, Possible Expla-
nations for Child SexualAbuse Allegations in Divorce, 61 AM. J. ORThOPSYCHIATRY 86,88
(1991); see Myers et al., supra note 8, at 87; Summit, supra note 25, at 186-87; Wood, supra
note 25, at 1393 & nn.192-93.
278. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49
(1985) (stating that expert testimony would be admissible to explain that "victims of moles-
tation typically make poor witnesses, and are reluctant to disclose or discuss the sordid
episodes").
The child may add more details as he or she becomes more comfortable with the
interviewers and appreciates the distance now enjoyed from the offender. Expert
testimony also may be important to explain the readily observable phenomenon
among children to minimize the amount of sexual abuse.... Children tend to
reveal only what they need to in order to be protected from further abuse.
Roe, supra note 253, at 107.
279. See, eg., State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. Ct. App.) (holding that psychiatrist
may testify as to ability of child sexual abuse victims to remember dates and to relate
details consistently and promptly), review denied, 683 P.2d 91 (Or. 1984). Inconsistency
may occur for several reasons. According to experts in the field:
First, when a child is repeatedly abused for months or years, individual molesta-
tions blur together. If the child is asked to describe particular episodes, the child
may become confused, and such confusion may lead to inconsistent versions of
events. Second, the ambivalence experienced by many victims sometimes causes
them to offer inconsistent accounts of abuse. Such inconsistency is found in chil-
dren of all ages. Third, with young children, inconsistency in describing past
events may be a product of developmental immaturity.
Myers et al., supra note 8, at 88. Most courts admit expert evidence to explain why chil-
dren's descriptions of sexual abuse may be inconsistent. Myers, supra note 23, at 18-19.
280. See Elaine R. Cacciola, Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in In-
trafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA L. REv. 175, 178-79 (1986).
281. Id.; see also Myers et al., supra note 8, at 34-35 & nn.120-22, 37 (stating that physi-
cal or laboratory evidence of child sexual abuse is not found in majority of cases); Debra C.
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or other negative feelings toward their abuser; 8 and that the recanta-
tion of an accusation must mean that the abuse did not occur 2 83 Con-
sequently, a number of courts reason that "[g]iven the possibility of
these misconceptions, it would be helpful and appropriate to allow
expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases."284 Likewise, an expert
witness would serve to dispel the mythology that has developed
around the concept of repressed memories recovered in adulthood.2 5
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides that "[tihe facts or data in
the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to [the expert] at or before
the hearing."'21 6 Given the limitations proposed below, 28 an expert
who testifies solely to provide the factfinder with background infor-
mation on repressed memory is in little danger of violating this rule.
The basis of the expert's opinion should consist of current research
findings, learned treatises, professional journals, clinical experience,
Moss, Do Kids Lie?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 25,25 ("One myth is that there is no sexual
abuse if a doctor finds no physical evidence of abuse. The truth is that most young children
are molested by fondling."); Susan Romer, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and
Visitation Disputes: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 647,
667 (1990) ("Often, there is no physical evidence of abuse.").
282. Research indicates that child victims often display no fear or anxiety in the pres-
ence of their abuser. See Jon R. Conte et al., Evaluating Children's Reports of Sexual
Abuse: Results from a Survey of Professionals, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYC-MATRY 428, 434
(1991).
A child who has been sexually abused, perhaps over much of his or her life, by an
adult with whom the child has an otherwise positive relationship may show no
fear because fear has not been induced by the experience or because the child has
learned that abuse does not take place while other adults ... are present.
I4; see also Corwin et al., supra note 25, at 98 ("That sexually abused children often dis-
play affection for the parents who have abused them is acknowledged by many profession-
als working with incestuous families ... ."); Fahn, supra note 25, at 203 (noting that child
victim "may feel torn by loyalty toward [the] abuser" and "still desires affection from the
parent"); Myers et al., supra note 8, at 88 ("It is not uncommon for abused children to want
to live with and demonstrate affection toward the abusing parent."). The explanation for
this behavior is that "[t]he only healthy option left for the child is to learn to accept the
situation and to survive. There is no way out, no place to run. The healthy, normal, emo-
tionally resilient child will learn to accommodate to the reality of continuing sexual abuse."
Summit, supra note 25, at 184.
283. See, e.g., Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1220 (noting that children commonly recant in time
between disclosure and trial for reasons that should compel courts to allow experts to ex-
plain this phenomenon to jury). "Children may recant for a number of reasons that in-
clude the guilt that they feel for the destruction of the family and the potential
imprisonment of a 'loved one.'" Roe, supra note 253, at 108; cf. infra text accompanying
notes 331-34 (discussing adults who recant allegations of child sexual abuse).
284. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 402.
285. See, e.g., cases cited supra part III.B.2.
286. FED. R. EVID. 703.
287. See infra part V.A.
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and the like, 88 all of which are "reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject." 289
Perhaps the most common argument for exclusion of expert evi-
dence is based on FRE 403: Its prejudicial impact substantially out-
weighs its probative value.29 ° However,
[t]he argument that such expert psychological testimony is
prejudicial because it bears on the credibility of a witness,
and thus invades the province of the jury, is simply wrong.
Expert testimony cannot "invade the province of the jury"
unless the jury is instructed that it must agree with the ex-
pert's assessment.29'
Thus, despite defendants' frequent protestations that expert wit-
nesses invade the province of the jury and lend a prejudicial aura of
credibility to plaintiffs' claims,2' courts have allowed expert testi-
mony because, quite simply, jurors are free to disregard it.293 In fact,
the judge may reinforce this point when giving instructions to the
jury.2 94 Moreover, if courts adopt the limitations suggested in this
Comment,295 they will further decrease the risk of prejudice to the
defendant.
5. Applying the Daubert standard
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,296 the United
States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 super-
288. See PENDERORAST, supra note 79, at 529; cf. Berliner et al., supra note 266, at 168,
170 (discussing proper bases for expert opinions in child sexual abuse cases).
289. FED. R. EVID. 703.
290. See FED. R. EvrD. 403.
291. Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv.
395, 443 (1985) (citations omitted).
292. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
293. United States v. Morgan, 554 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.) ("The argument has long since
been laid to rest that, where an expert expresses an opinion on an assumed state of facts,
he is usurping the province of the jury."), cert denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
294. See, e.g.., LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., 3 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CvIL, 76.01, at 76-25 (1994) ("You should not, however, accept this witness' testimony
merely because he is an expert. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judg-
ment, and common sense. The determination of the facts in this case rests solely with
you.").
295. See infra part V.A.
296. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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seded the seventy-year-old Frye "general acceptance" test 297 for ad-nissibility of expert testimony and novel scientific evidence.29 Under
the more liberal standard of Daubert, the scientific testimony given by
a witness need not be known to a certainty, for, as Justice Blackmun
wrote, "arguably, there are no certainties in science." 2" It would
seem, then, that the debate among scientists over the validity of re-
pressed memory theory need not preclude expert evidence about it at
trial.
However, Daubert does require federal judges to "ensure that
any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only rele-
vant, but reliable. 3 0 One would thus expect defendants to argue that
(1) recovered memories of child sexual abuse are too unreliable to be
admitted as evidence;301 and (2) the current state of scientific knowl-
edge about repressed memory is too contradictory and inconclusive to
be a reliable basis for expert testimony.30 2
An alternative argument for parties wishing to call experts is that
opinion testimony regarding repressed memory should not be subject
to Daubert at all. Because theories supporting and challenging the
phenomenon of repressed memory theory are more properly charac-
terized as social or behavioral science-that is, "soft" as opposed to
"hard" science-it would be unfair to apply any standard beyond
Rule 702's criterion of helpfulness to the jury.30 3
By analogy, state courts adhering to the Frye standard are split on
the issue of whether it should be applied to the expert opinion of a
psychiatrist or psychologist. Those courts that decline to do so recog-
nize "a fundamental difference between techniques and procedures
based on chemical, biological, or other physical sciences as contrasted
with theories and assumptions that are based on the behavioral sci-
297. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (restricting expert testi-
mony and scientific evidence to that which is "sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs"), superseded by FED. R. EVID.
702, construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
298. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799.
299. Id. at 2795.
300. Id. For commentary debating how the reliability of scientific evidence should be
measured, see Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert." A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. Rev. 715 (1994).
301. See infra part IV.B.1.
302. Compare supra part III.A (discussing research on traumatic amnesia) with infra
part IV.A (describing experiments that demonstrate unreliability and malleability of
memory).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 263-67.
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ences."3°4 As one court put it, "'[p]sychologists, when called as ex-
perts, do not talk about things or objects; they talk about people.
They do not dehumanize people with whom they deal by treating
them as objects composed of interacting biological systems. Rather,
they speak of the whole person.' "305
These issues-whether the Daubert standard should be applied
to expert evidence on repressed memory theory and, if so, whether it
is satisfied-have yet to be resolved in the courts.30 6 Undoubtedly,
the future debate on these evidentiary questions will turn on the re-
sults of ongoing scientific research into memory.
IV. "FALSE": Tim ARGUMENTs AGAINST REPRESSED MEMORY
A. Invalidity-or Questionability-of Repressed Memory Theory
According to academic critics, "the theory behind memory recov-
ery has never been verified experimentally. '3 7 Memories that surface
during therapy are particularly vulnerable to charges of unreliability
"because psychotherapy is a healing technique and not a search for
truth.
308
1. Insufficient scientific evidence
Most experts agree that more research needs to be done.30 9 Re-
searcher David Holmes reviewed sixty years of scientific literature
and found no controlled laboratory studies supporting the concept of
memory repression.310 Psychiatrist George Ganaway, who has seen
more than 200 patients with severe dissociative disorders, described
anecdotal reports of recovered memories as " 'empirical observations
lacking in scientific underpinnings.' ",311 Questions still remain to be
304. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 404.
305. Id. (quoting Dirk Lorenzen, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony
in Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MiAMI L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1988)).
306. None of the cases discussed in part III.B.2, supra, address the applicability of
Daubert to expert testimony on repressed memory theory.
307. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 8, at 71.
"Sixty years of experiments that would demonstrate the phenomenon have failed
to produce any evidence of its existence. The notion of repression has never been
more than an unsubstantiated speculation tied to other Freudian concepts and
speculative mechanisms. The only support repression has ever had is anecdotal
and contributed by psychoanalysts who presume the existence of the repression
mechanism."
Id. (quoting sociology professor Richard Ofshe of University of California at Berkeley).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 8, at 533.
310. Id. at 519.
311. Id. (quoting George Ganaway) (citation omitted).
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answered: When repressed memories are recovered years later, are
they accurate? 312 Also,
[ils it true that repression of extremely traumatic experiences
is common? Do these experiences invade us despite the fact
that "all the good juice of consciousness has drained out[?]"
... Do [combat veterans and incest survivors] share in com-
mon the use of "massive repression" as a mechanism for cop-
ing? If so, how do we explain findings obtained with
children who witness parental murder and other atrocities
[and do not repress the memory]? ...
... Is it necessarily true that all people who display
symptoms of severe mental distress have had some early
childhood trauma (probably abuse) that is responsible for
the distress?
3 13
Without answers to questions such as these, there is a real danger
that fabricated memories will cause irreparable damage to the reputa-
tions of potentially innocent people.314 Furthermore, uncritical ac-
ceptance of all repressed memories as true, "no matter how dubious[,
is] ... bound to lead to an increased likelihood that society in general
will disbelieve the genuine cases of childhood sexual abuse that truly
deserve our sustained attention. '315
2. Implantation of false memories
According to one theory, "[t]o say that memory might be false
does not mean that the person is deliberately lying. ' 316 A survivor
might honestly believe false memories
as a way to provide a screen for perhaps more prosaic but,
ironically less tolerable, painful experiences of childhood.
Creating a fantasy of abuse with its relatively clear-cut dis-
tinction between good and evil may provide the needed logi-
cal explanation for confusing experiences and feelings. The
core material for the false memories can be borrowed from
the accounts of others who are either known personally or
encountered in literature, movies, and television.1 7
312. See, e.g., id at 524.
313. Id at 533-34 (citations omitted).
314. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 525.
317. Id.
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Under this view a primary source for fabricated memories are
popular self-help guides such as The Courage to Heal,318 Repressed
Memories,31 9 and Secret Survivors.32 0 Another oft-named source of
false memories is the therapist's office.321 Some attribute confabula-
tion322 to the well-meaning but misguided efforts of therapists who
unintentionally suggest repressed memories of childhood trauma to
their troubled patients.323 Dr. Herman has observed:
Therapists... sometimes fall prey to the desire for certainty.
Zealous conviction can all too easily replace an open, inquir-
ing attitude. In the past, this desire for certainty generally
led therapists to discount or minimize their patients' trau-
matic experiences.... [T]he recent rediscovery of psycholog-
ical trauma has led to errors of the opposite kind. Therapists
have been known to tell patients, merely on the basis of a
suggestive history or "symptom profile," that they definitely
have had a traumatic experience. . . .Any expression of
doubt can be dismissed as "denial."'324
One of the most vocalcritics of repressed memory therapy is the
False Memory Syndrome Foundation (FMSF), an organization formed
in 1992 by parents who claim to have been falsely accused of child
sexual abuse.32 The members of this volunteer advocacy group lend
moral support to each other and lobby public opinion through the me-
dia.326 In essence, the FMSF's position is that claims of survivors are
based on false memories implanted by "a large, amorphous, profit-
oriented 'sex abuse industry,' a conglomerate of New-Age healers,
318. ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL (3d ed. 1994). Critics have
called this book the "'bible' of the incest book industry." Loftus, supra note 8, at 525.
319. RENEE FREDRICKSON, REPRESSED MEMORIES: A JOURNEY TO RECOVERY FROM
SEXUAL ABUSE (1992). This book contains a disclaimer advising readers that "ft]he infor-
mation in this book is intended for educational purposes only. It is not intended to replace
diagnosis and treatment by competent professionals." Id, at 7.
320. BLUME, supra note 55.
321. See, e.g., Yapko, supra note 88, at 31-37.
322. "Confabulation" is "a filling in of gaps in memory by free fabrication." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTnONARY 475 (1976).
323. Loftus, supra note 8, at 526. Therapists' " 'facile acceptance and.., validation of
uncorroborated trauma memories' "may be, at least in part, an overreaction to the profes-
sion's long history of dismissing such memories as pure fantasy. Id. (quoting George
Ganaway).
324. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 180.
325. Richard Simon, From the Editor, FAM. THERAPY NETwoRKER, Sept./Oct. 1993, at
2; Wylie, supra note 36, at 20, 22.
326. See Wylie, supra note 36, at 18-23.
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self-help movement promoters, political activists, radical feminists, so-
cial service providers and mental health professionals." 327
Their protestations are similar to those heard from others ac-
cused of sexually abusing a child: Even if the defendant is ultimately
cleared of all charges, the accusation alone is enough to ruin his or her
reputation, marriage, family life, friendships, career, or business.32
When an adult survivor sues, the added element of memory repres-
sion provides another ground for argument, and, since the authenticity
of recovered memories is inherently difficult to prove, it is the issue on
which survivors and therapists are most vulnerable to attack.329 It is
important to remember, however, that "[b]ecause accused persons are
motivated to verbally and even mentally deny an abusive past, simple
denials cannot constitute cogent evidence that the victim's memories
are not authentic. '33 °
The FMSF and other critics of repressed memory therapy often
support their position by pointing to cases of recantation. A highly
publicized example was the suit brought and then dropped by Steven
Cook against Cardinal Joseph Bernardin of Chicago in 1993.33' In
these cases the recanters blamed, and sometimes sued, therapists for
implanting memories which they have come to believe are false.332
It cannot be denied that some memories may indeed be false. It
is useful to keep in mind, however, that recantation is common among
327. Id. at 22. On the other hand, in the context of sexual abuse cases where the victim
is a child, Professor John E.B. Myers has written that the allegation most likely to be false
is the one asserting there is" 'a wave of fabricated allegations.'" Myers, supra note 23, at
25.
328. Wylie, supra note 36, at 20.
329. See, e.g., LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 79, passim; RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SEXUAL HYS-
TERIA passim (1994); PENDERGRAST, supra note 79, passim.
330. Loftus, supra note 8, at 525.
331. In November 1993 Cook filed a lawsuit against Cardinal Bernardin after therapy
uncovered memories of being sexually abused as a teenager. PENDERGRAST, supra note
79, at 485. Cook later withdrew the claim, "explaining that he now realized how questiona-
ble hypnotically induced memories could be." Id.
332. See, e.g., id. at 315-58; Sally Jacobs, Sex Abuse Memories in Question, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1993, at 1 (reporting that former patient sued therapist after "conclud[ing]
she had been abused not by anyone in her family, but by a therapist preoccupied with
sexual abuse"); Jaroff, supra note 3, at 52 (stating that woman decided memories of abuse
by father were false and sued California psychiatric hospital for "pain that she and her
family suffered"). In Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, 602 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991), the
court upheld a jury malpractice verdict against a therapist who mishandled repressed mem-
ory therapy. Id. at 293. In fact, the court of appeal reversed and remanded, determining
that "[t]he trial court should have instructed the jury on punitive damages and allowed the
jury to determine if they were appropriate." It.
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child victims of sexual abuse333 and that the causal factors-feelings of
loss, fear, loyalty, and guilt-may continue operating well into
adulthood.31
3. Research findings
Research purporting to show that false memories can be im-
planted buttresses the position taken by the FMSF and like-minded
critics. Hundreds of studies done over the last two decades seem to
support the hypothesis that false memories can be created or that real
memories can be distorted.335 For example, subjects exposed to misin-
formation "have recalled.., a cleanshaven man as having a mustache,
straight hair as curly, and even something as large and conspicuous as
a barn in a bucolic scene that contained no buildings at all."
'336
In one study researchers asked subjects how they heard the news
of the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986-first on the
morning after the accident and then again almost three years later.337
Comparison revealed that none of the later memories were 100% ac-
curate and more than one-third were extremely inaccurate.33 1 ' An-
other experiment tested the recollections of spectators who witnessed
a football player go into cardiac arrest on the field.339 In interviews
conducted six years after the event, subjects who had received a false
suggestion absorbed it into their memories; more than twenty-five
333. Fahn, supra note 25, at 204. Children often retract allegations in cases of substanti-
ated sexual abuse. Summit, supra note 25, at 188. The victim's conflict of loyalty, fear of
consequences, and sense of responsibility for "the chaotic aftermath of disclosure" can lead
to such retractions. Id.
Following disclosure, powerful forces may work to convince the child to change
the facts or to recant altogether. Such forces are particularly strong in in-
trafamilial abuse cases, where the perpetrator, with or without the cooperation of
the nonabusing parent, seeks to persuade the child to change or deny prior allega-
tions. There may be ample opportunity to instill fear, guilt, and ambivalence.
Myers et al., supra note 8, at 87 (footnote omitted). Most courts admit expert testimony to
explain why children recant sexual abuse allegations. Josephine Bulkley et al., Key Eviden-
tiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
63, 72 (Josephine Bulkley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994); Myers, supra note 23, at 18.
334. See 140 CONG. REc. H87 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder (D-
Colo.)) ("The trauma [child sexual abuse] victims face doesn't end when they reach adult-
hood. The road to recovery is excruciatingly long and often stretches far into adulthood.").
335. Loftus, supra note 8, at 530.
336. It. (citation omitted).
337. Ulric Neisser & Nicole Harsch, Phantom Flashbulbs: False Recollections of Hear-
ing the News About Challenger, in AFFECT AND ACCURACY IN RECALL. STUDIES OF
"FLAsaBULB" MEMORIES 9, 13 (Eugene Winograd & Ulric Neisser eds., 1992).
338. Id. at 18-19.
339. Loftus, supra note 8, at 531 (citing data in unpublished doctoral dissertation by J.
Abhold at University of Arkansas, 1992).
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percent believed they had seen blood on the player's jersey although
there had been none.340 Likewise, subjects have remembered voting
in a certain election when in reality they had not 1 and described an
assault that never happened after hearing the "victim" lie about the
incident.' 2
However, clinicians who bear witness to the recovery of authentic
memories in their daily practice "contend that what's being measured
in the lab, which shows that false memories can be implanted, [may
not be] the same thing" as recovered memories of actual child sexual
abuse.? 3 Ethical obligations-not to mention common decency-bar
researchers from inducing comparably severe trauma in laboratory
subjects. 3 4 Hence, the fact that ordinary memories can be implanted
or distorted may be irrelevant to the question of whether the theory of
repressed traumatic memory is valid.345
B. Arguments Against Admitting Expert Testimony
According to those who challenge the validity of repressed mem-
ory, the legislatures that have extended their statutes of limitations
and courts that have applied the discovery rule for child sexual abuse
claims may have acted precipitously. 34  Representing this view, one
psychologist argued that "when we move from the privacy of the ther-
apy session, in which the client's reality may be the only reality that is
important, into the courtroom, in which there can be but a single real-
ity, then we as citizens in a democratic society are entitled to more
solid evidence."' 7
Common reasons for barring expert testimony on repressed
memory include: (1) it is too unreliable;348 (2) its prejudicial impact
340. 1d
341. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
342. Jeffrey J. Haugaard et al., Children's Definitions of the Truth and Their Competency
as Witnesses in Legal Proceedings, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 253, 259-65 (1991).
343. Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
344. See Yates & Nasby, supra note 186, at 305; Wylie, supra note 163, at 43; Stolar
Interview, supra note 79.
345. Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
346. See, ag., Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E2d 870, 874 (Ohio 1994) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting)
("We simply do not have in the record.., sufficient scientific, empirical or other informa-
tion from which to craft a rule of law that will protect those accused of being abusers and
those who have been abused or believe they have been abused as children.").
347. Loftus, supra note 8, at 534.
348. A number of commentators have argued that psychiatric and psychological opin-
ions in general are not sufficiently reliable for legal purposes. See, ag., Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
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on the jury outweighs its probative value;349 (3) expert witnesses are
inherently biased because they are compensated by proponents350 for
their testimony; and (4) if both sides proffer experts, the ensuing "bat-
tle of the experts" confuses the jury more than it assists the jury's
understanding of the issue.351
1. Repressed memory evidence is too unreliable
At a pretrial motion to dismiss, where the judge must decide
whether the evidence of memory repression is sufficient to trigger an
extended statute of limitations or application of the discovery rule, the
defendant typically will argue that the plaintiff's memories have been
rendered unreliable by the passage of time.352 In accepting this argu-
ment, one court reasoned:
[N]o empirical, verifiable evidence exists of the occurrences
and resulting harm which plaintiff alleges .... There is no
objective manifestation of these allegations. Rather, they
are based on plaintiff's alleged recollection of a memory
long buried in the unconscious which she asserts was trig-
gered by psychological therapy.
... [T]he testimony of... family, friends, schoolteachers
and treating psychologists ... would [not] provide objective
evidence that the alleged acts occurred.... Witnesses' recol-
lections... usually become less reliable in a matter of min-
utes, much less years. Thus, the more time had passed, the
less trustworthy such testimony would be.353
Accordingly, the defendant will ask the court to find that the peace-
of-mind rationale underlying statutes of limitations354 outweighs the
plaintiff's right to redress.
At trial a similar argument is advanced: Even if recovered mem-
ories are "genuine," they cannot be scientifically verified and there-
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974); Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative
Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REv. 331 (1985).
349. See Cacciola, supra note 280, at 204; infra part IV.B.2.
350. In the context of evidence, a proponent is a party who offers evidence. BLAcK's
LAW DICIONARY 1218 (6th ed. 1990).
351. See, ag., Graham, supra note 125, at 47; Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1130; infra part IV.B.4.
352. See, eag., Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1986) (en bane), superseded by
WAS H. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1995).
353. Id at 229.
354. Statutes of limitations compel plaintiffs to file timely claims in order to protect
parties from having to defend themselves against stale claims. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
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fore should not be admitted as evidence of child sexual abuse.3 55 A
number of experts share this viewpoint. 6 They point to studies pur-
porting to show that "it is possible to create an entire memory for a
traumatic event that never happened" '357 and the fact that, absent in-
dependent corroboration, there is no scientifically validated way to
distinguish authentic memories from confabulations.
3 58
When hypnosis is used to assist the retrieval process, the reliabil-
ity of recovered memories becomes even more problematic.3 9 Ac-
cording to one therapist who utilizes this method in his practice, a
person under hypnosis produces more material-some of it true,
some of it seemingly real. 6 ° It could be unintentionally and uncon-
sciously confabulated; the person doesn't really know-and can't
know-for sure. 6 ' To the patient it can feel very real, but unless
there is some kind of external corroboration, memories retrieved
through hypnosis should be used only for leads, not evidence.362
The opposing view distinguishes between hypnosis used to treat
witnesses for amnesia caused by recent violent experiences and hyp-
nosis used to restore memory for experiences that occurred in child-
hood-a distinction that courts have failed to make.363  One
commentator wrote:
[N]o court has given serious and thoughtful consideration to
the question of whether memory restored by clinical hypno-
sis is more trustworthy than memory restored in a forensic
context.
355. See supra part IV.A.1.
356. See supra part IV.A.3.
357. Lorus & KETCHAM, supra note 79, at 90.
358. Id
359. Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
360. Id.
361. 1d
362. Id. To illustrate the distinction between using hypnotically refreshed memories as
an investigative tool and using them as evidence, Dr. Stolar cited two examples from per-
sonal experience. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department once requested his
assistance in a murder case and asked him to hypnotize a friend of the suspect to see if she
could recall anything the suspect might have said about the crime. Id Under hypnosis, she
recalled the suspect saying that he killed the victim and threw the gun off the Santa Monica
pier. Id. Divers subsequently found the gun at that location. Id By contrast, in another
case, Dr. Stolar hypnotized a witness to a hit-and-run accident who could remember only
the first two numbers of the suspect's license plate number. Id Under hypnosis, the wit-
ness came up with a full number, but further investigation revealed that it was nonexistent.
Id
363. Kanovitz, supra note 11, at 1192 n.17.
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... Events like automobile crashes and attacks by stran-
gers often occur under adverse conditions that may interfere
with the patient's ability to correctly perceive important de-
tails of the event. Hypnosis cannot retrieve information if it
was never stored in memory.... Lack of memory for details
exaggerates the tendency of hypnotized subjects to incorpo-
rate suggestions and confabulate missing information ...
Consequently, hypnosis may be a less reliable memory resto-
ration technique for victims of catastrophic accidents and vi-
olent events involving strangers than for victims of sexual
abuse perpetrated by members of their own family.36"
2. Prejudicial impact Qutweighs probative value
On the narrower question of whether the jury should hear expert
testimony, one of the most common reasons given for exclusion is
based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403: The prejudicial impact of
expert testimony on repressed memory outweighs its probative
value.365 The charge of unfair prejudice stems from the perceived ten-
dency of juries to give too much weight to such evidence due to the
expert witness' aura of authority.366 In several cases, for example,
courts have held that expert testimony regarding rape trauma syn-
drome was unfairly prejudicial because it "'gave a stamp of scientific
legitimacy to the truth of the complaining witness's factual
testimony.' ,367
Moreover, at least one court has questioned the credibility of
mental health experts who testify for abuse survivors.
[T]he testimony of treating psychologists or psychiatrists
would not reduce, much less eliminate, the subjectivity of
plaintiff's claim. Psychology and psychiatry are imprecise
disciplines. Unlike the biological sciences, their methods of
investigation are primarily subjective and most of their find-
ings are not based on physically observable evidence. The
fact that plaintiff asserts she discovered the wrongful acts
364. Id.
365. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence." FED. R. EvD. 403.
366. See, e.g., United States v, Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977).
367. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1984) (quoting People v. Izzo, 282
N.W.2d 10, 11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)).
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through psychological therapy does not validate their
occurrence. 368
Courts have excluded unquestionably relevant evidence in cir-
cumstances which "entail risks which range all the way from inducing
decision on a purely emotional basis, at one extreme, to nothing more
harmful than merely wasting time, at the other extreme. '369 Thus, a
defendant in a child sexual abuse case may argue that the admission of
expert testimony on memory repression would violate Rule 403.
3. Experts for hire
Another frequently heard argument against the admissibility of
expert evidence focuses on the problem of unscrupulous expert wit-
nesses for hire.370 Because the proponent pays for the expert's serv-
ices, it is hardly unexpected that the expert's opinion will support the
proponent's position.371 There is also an increased risk of false testi-
mony from expert witnesses due in part to the fact that their testi-
mony consists of opinions, not facts; thus, they cannot be prosecuted
for perjury.372
Nevertheless, expert evidence continues to "play a large (and
perhaps growing) role in litigation," 73 despite the fact that this con-
cern has existed for more than a hundred years. As one nineteenth-
century commentator observed, "'Perhaps the testimony which least
deserves credit with a jury is that of skilled witnesses .... [I]t is often
quite surprising to see with what facility, and to what extent, their
views can be made to correspond with the wishes and interests of the
parties who call them.' "371
Furthermore, parties can be expected to produce "the best wit-
ness, not necessarily the best qualified expert. ' 375 They also might
avail themselves of tactical maneuvers to defeat either the assurances
368. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229.
369. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
370. See Graham, supra note 125, at 45 (noting that problem existed as early as 1858).
371. See id. at 47.
372. Jeremiah M. Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 665, 678 (1964).
373. Gross, supra note 351, at 1116. "Some expert can almost always be found to testify
to any plausible (and many implausible) expert opinions; if nothing else, a friendly expert
can serve to undermine any expert who testifies for the opposition." Id. at 1130.
374. Id. at 1114 (quoting John P. Taylor, TREATISE oN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 45-50,
at 65-69 (3d ed. 1858) (emphasis in original)).
375. Graham, supra note 125, at 47.
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of trustworthiness built into the Federal Rules of Evidence376 or effec-
tive pretrial discovery of expert witnesses.3 77 Such tactics further un-
dermine the factfinder's search for truth.
4. Battle of experts confuses jury
Allowing the defense to call experts of its own may be a less satis-
factory solution for the defendant than exclusion of the plaintiff's ex-
pert evidence. If both parties call experts who give conflicting
testimony, the ensuing battle of the experts may confuse rather than
convince the jury378 and thus be grounds for exclusion under Rule
403 .37 This is yet another problem with expert evidence that has per-
sisted for more than a century.
380
Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons pro-
fessing to be experts may be obtained to any amount; and it
often occurs that not only many days, but even weeks, are
consumed in cross-examinations, to test the skill or knowl-
edge of such witnesses and the correctness of their opinions,
wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and
jury, and perplexing, instead of elucidating, the questions in-
volved in the issue.3 8'
Alternatively, if the contradictory opinions of the experts cancel
each other out in the jurors' minds, a defendant may object on the
grounds that Rule 403 also allows exclusion in order to avoid "undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."38
V. PROPOSED JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
The metaphor of the scales of justice represents the law's attempt
to balance conflicting interests. When difficult evidentiary issues
arise, the judge's task is to find a middle ground which accommodates
376. For example, a party might try to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence
"through the back door" as the basis of an expert's opinion in order to show that the
reasonable reliance requirement of Rule 703 has been met. Id. at 77-78.
377. For example, an attorney might postpone selection of an expert until the last mo-
ment, answer interrogatories about.an expert in a summary and conclusive manner, or
direct the expert not to prepare a report. Id. at 85-86.
378. See, e.g., id. at 47; Gross, supra note 351, at 1130 ("Disputes in fields of expert
knowledge are overemphasized at the expense of areas of general agreement, and it is
difficult, or impossible, for the trier of fact to learn the consensus in a field.").
379. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
380. Gross, supra note 351, at 1114, 1130.
381. Winans v. New York & Erie R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 101 (1858).
382. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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the rights of all parties.383 In the analogous areas of child sexual abuse
prosecutions and hypnotically refreshed testimony, the majority of ju-
risdictions allow expert testimony-but only within the bounds of
carefully prescribed limits." Hence, this Comment recommends a
similarly balanced approach to repressed memory litigation.
A. Limit the Permissible Scope of Expert Testimony
Expert testimony should be limited to general background infor-
mation3 5 about adults who recover repressed memories of childhood
sexual abuse. The primary purpose of such evidence would be to edu-
cate the jurors and dispel any misconceptions they may have about
this subject matter.3  Restricting expert opinions in this way need not
render the expert opinion irrelevant under Rule 402.3 1 As noted by
the FRE Advisory Committee, "Evidence which is essentially back-
ground in nature... is universally offered and admitted as an aid to
understanding.... A rule limiting admissibility to evidence directed to
a controversial point would invite the exclusion of this helpful
evidence, or at least the raising of endless questions over its
admission.
' 388
Impermissible uses for expert testimony in repressed memory
cases would include allowing the witness to: (1) directly bolster or
attack the proponent's credibility; (2) state an opinion on whether the
plaintiff actually repressed memories of child sexual abuse; (3) state
an opinion on whether the plaintiff's memories are accurate, that is,
whether child sexual abuse in fact occurred and, if so, whether the
defendant was the perpetrator; and (4) testify as to subjects outside
the witness's area of expertise. Both sides would be well advised to
file a motion in limine asking the judge to define at a pretrial confer-
ence the specific parameters of admissibility.389 If the judge grants the
motion, the court can protect the jury from hearing prejudicial, inad-
383. For example, Rule 403 gives judges the final word in close questions of admissibil-
ity. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
384. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
385. For commentary on a similarly tailored approach to expert "framework" testimony
in child sexual abuse prosecutions, see Christopher B. Mueller, Meta-Evidence: Do We
Need It?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 819, 834-35 (1992).
386. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 102, 264.
387. "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. Evm. 402.
388. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
389. See FED. R. EvlD. 104(a); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 202-04 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. practitioner treatise ser. 1992).
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missible evidence, and counsel will have a stronger basis for strategic
decisions .
390
Generally speaking, courts should consider the following factors
in establishing the ground rules for admissibility in a particular case:
(1) the age of the plaintiff at the time of the alleged abuse;391 (2) the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant;392 (3) the length
of time of the alleged abuse;393 (4) the degree of violence associated
with the alleged abuse;394 and (5) the means by which the memory was
recovered.395
Placing limits on expert evidence regarding repressed memory is,
simply put, a compromise. It recognizes the danger of prejudice to the
defendant396 as well as the plaintiff's difficulties in meeting the burden
of proof.39 Moreover, it is an approach consistent with the moderate
lines of court decisions that have addressed the admissibility of expert
testimony on child sexual abuse and hypnotically refreshed testimony.
In prosecutions for child sexual abuse, courts have taken three
approaches to the admissibility of expert testimony. The liberal view
allows a qualified expert not only to testify about common symptoms
of child sexual abuse, but also to give an opinion as to the truthfulness
of a child witness.398 The conservative view prohibits expert opinions
390. MCCORMICK ON EVMENCE, supra note 389, at 202.
391. See Briere & Conte, supra note 155, at 26 ("[E]arly molestation onset... [was]
related to an increased likelihood of amnesia); Herman & Schatzow, supra note 152, at 4
("A strong association was observed between the degree of reported amnesia and the age
of onset ... of the sexual abuse."); Williams, supra note 161, at 1171-73 ("[A]buse that
occurred at an earlier age was more likely to be forgotten .... ."); Stolar Interview, supra
note 79.
392. See Berliner, supra note 24, at 6 ("Sexual abuse experiences involving., a close
relationship to the offender are associated with greater negative impact .... "); Williams,
supra note 161, at 1174 ("Sexual abuse by a stranger is more likely to be remembered
... ."); Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
393. Herman & Schatzow, supra note 152, at 4 ("A strong association was observed
between the degree of reported amnesia and the ... duration of the sexual abuse."); Wil-
liams, supra note 161, at 1172 ("Those molested by strangers were more likely to recall the
abuse than those molested by someone they knew .. "); Stolar Interview, supra note 79.
394. Briere & Conte, supra note 155, at 26 ("[A]buse-specific amnesia was associated
with violent abuse (e.g., involving physical injury, multiple perpetrators, fears of death if
the abuse was disclosed) ... ."); Herman & Schatzow, supra note 152, at 5 ("[A] relation-
ship was observed between ... violent or sadistic abuse experiences and the resort to
massive repression as a defense.").
395. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47, part III.A.4.
396. See supra part IV.B.2.
397. See supra part III.B.2.
398. See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984) (holding that where expert
diagnosed complainant as sexually abused child, defendant's objection on grounds of unre-
liability went to weight, not admissibility of testimony).
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as to whether a child was sexually abused, as well as any support-
direct or indirect- for a child's allegations. 399 The intermediate view
bars direct commentary on a victim's credibility but allows expert tes-
timony to rebut a defense of fabrication by, for example, explaining a
victim's delay in reporting, reluctance to disclose, or recantation.400
Likewise, in civil cases where the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony is at issue, the authorities are split. One approach
399. See State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I. 1981) (stating that gynecologist's opin-
ion based on history given by child improperly bolstered complainant's credibility); State v.
Haseltine, 352 N.W.2d 673,676 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that expert's identification of
child as incest victim was impermissible because no witness may testify "that another men-
tally and physically competent witness is telling the truth").
400. See United States v. Banks, 36 MJ. 150, 163 (C.M.A. 1992) (finding reversible er-
ror in judge's admission of psychologist's "'profile' of a family ripe for child sexual abuse"
if offered to establish defendant's guilt, but not if offered "to argue relevant adjudicative
facts-for example to prove [defendant's] alleged marital sexual dysfunction to establish a
motive for the[] offenses"); Hall v. Arkansas, 692 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985)
(indicating that expert testimony regarding dynamics of child sexual abuse cases would be
admissible only if offered "to rebut a misconception about the presumed behavior of a...
victim"); People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 393-94, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 891 (1988)
(holding that expert testimony should be limited to rebuttal evidence after attack by de-
fendant on victim's credibility and must be targeted at specific misconception about child
sexual abuse), review denied, No. S007116, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 614 (Nov. 10, 1988); People v.
Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099,215 Cal. Rptr. 45,49 (1985) (finding that expert may
state that "as a class[,] victims of molestation typically make poor witnesses, and are reluc-
tant to disclose or discuss the sordid episodes"); People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d
561, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804 (1984) (allowing expert to explain victims' reluctance to
disclose); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Mich. 1990) (holding that "evidence of
behavioral patterns of sexually abused children is admissible 'for the narrow purpose of
rebutting an inference that a complainant's postincident behavior was inconsistent with
that of an actual victim of sexual abuse'" (quoting People v. Beckley, 409 N.W.2d 759, 763
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam))); State v. Hall, 406 N.W2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1987)
(allowing expert to testify about behavior patterns that are seemingly inconsistent with
crime victims in general); Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev. 1984) (permitting prose-
cution's expert to rehabilitate victim's credibility after defense counsel cross-examined vic-
tim about reporting delay); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Or. 1983) (stating
that courts should allow experts to explain why children commonly recant abuse allega-
tions and contrasting child molestation with other kinds of crimes such as burglary, where,
if victim recanted before trial, jury likely would believe victim fabricated complaint); State
v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. Ct. App.) (admitting psychiatrist's testimony on ability of
child sexual abuse victims to remember dates and relate details consistently and promptly),
review denied, 683 P.2d 91 (Or. 1984); State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 179-80 (Wash. 1984)
(allowing social worker to testify about reporting delays in general, but precluding opinion
as to whether child victim was telling truth); State v. Fitzgerald, 694 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that pediatrician's opinion that children had been molested effec-
tively vouched for child's truthfulness and thus was improperly admitted); State v. Maule,
667 P.2d 96, 99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (implying in dicta that expert's theory based on
typical characteristics of sexually abused children did not meet requirements for expert
testimony and that it would be reversible error to allow any statistical testimony showing
who would be most likely to abuse children).
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permits a witness who has undergone hypnosis to testify as to those
facts or events recalled before or after such hypnosis.4 1 The other
view allows hypnotically refreshed testimony only as to facts or events
recalled before hypnosis and requires that a proper foundation be
laid.4°
Although Rule 704(a) allows expert opinions on ultimate is-
sues,40 3 this Comment recommends that they be excluded in order to
maintain a balance between the parties' conflicting interests40 4 and to
avoid the potential for inconsistent application of Rule 403, which is
completely within the discretion of the trial judge.40 5
B. Minimize Prejudicial Impact by Using Procedural Safeguards
1. Judge as gatekeeper and referee
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the role of the judge is to
act as gatekeeper for evidence offered at trial.40 6 In Daubert, the
Supreme Court stated:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the outset.., whether the ex-
pert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that
(2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a
fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.407
401. Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974); Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456, 457
(5th Cir. 1973).
402. Lemieux v. Superior Court, 644 P2d 1300, 1303 (Ariz. 1982); Austin v. Barker, 85
N.Y.S. 465, 466-67 (App. Div. 1904).
403. "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
FED. R. Evm. 704(a).
404. See supra part H.D.1-2.
405. The court may exclude evidence, no matter how relevant, if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, the danger of mis-
leading the jury, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R.
Evm. 403. Compare supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text (arguing that Rule 403
need not be grounds for exclusion of expert testimony regarding repressed memory) with
part IV.B.2 (arguing that prejudicial impact of such expert testimony substantially out-
weighs its probative value).
406. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 & n.7
(1993).
407. Id. at 2796 (citation and footnote omitted).
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One of the threshold questions a judge might face is "the qualifi-
cation of a person to be a witness. ' 408 Most courts take a liberal, flexi-
ble approach, to the evaluation of an expert's qualifications. 40 9
However, to ensure that the testimony assists the trier of fact, an ex-
pert witness in a repressed memory suit should be a licensed psychia-
trist, psychologist, or clinical social worker with education, training,
and experience in working with adult survivors of child sexual
abuse.410 Such an approach would be consistent with case law gov-
erning expert qualifications in criminal prosecutions of child sexual
abuse.41 '
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide additional tools with
which the judge can minimize the risk of prejudice by controlling the
parties' presentation of proof. For instance, Rule 611(a) gives the
judge "reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses"; 412 Rule 615 enables the judge to exclude any witness from
the courtroom; 413 and Rule 705 allows the judge to demand that ex-
perts disclose the facts or data-underlying their opinions.414
408. See FED. R. EvD. 104(a) ("In making its determination [the court] is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges."); FED. R. EvID. 702 (requir-
ing that witness be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education"). Preliminary evidentiary matters should be established by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
409. See Gardner v. General Motors Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating
that an expert witness "should not be required to satisfy an overly narrow test of his [or
her] qualifications").
410. See Berliner et al., supra note 266, at 168, 170.
411. See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990). The Michigan Supreme
Court wrote:
In cases involving sexual abuse of children, expert testimony has been presented
by physicians, crisis counselors, social workers, police officers, and psychologists.
The study of child sexual abuse is an emerging... specialized field of human
behavior. Not all psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers will qualify to
give expert testimony on the subject.... [W]hat [is] determinative [is] the nature
and extent of knowledge and actual experience ....
Id at 399-400 (citations omitted).
412. "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogat-
ing witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
413. "At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own mo-
tion." FED. R. EVID. 615.
414. "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise.
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination." FED. R. Evm. 705.
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2. Cross-examination
Vigorous cross-examination can provide yet another safeguard
against prejudicial or unreliable expert testimony. Because trial
judges have discretion to allow cross-examination that ventures be-
yond "the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affect-
ing the credibility of the witness,' 415 they may-and usually do-
apply this discretion broadly, especially when experts "give opinions
on matters normally outside the common knowledge and experience
of laypeople. ' '4
16
On cross-examination counsel may impeach an expert witness by
using the same methods used for lay witnesses. 417 A well-prepared
adversary also will inquire into the expert's "qualifications, experi-
ence, and sincerity; weaknesses in the opinion's basis; the sufficiency
of the assumptions; and the soundness of the opinion. '4 18 Addition-
ally, counsel may try to show bias by questioning the witness about
financial remuneration for his or her expert testimony.419 "Continued
employment by a party, or prior testimony for the same party or the
same attorney, also may establish financial interest. '420
To attack the facts or opinions on which the expert has based an
opinion, counsel may ask whether the absence of certain evidence or a
conflicting version of the evidence would affect the expert's testi-
mony.421 If cross-examination reveals that the expert has relied solely
on anecdotal reports of patients recovering long-buried memories of
childhood trauma or, on the other hand, the expert's knowledge is
limited to laboratory experiments on memory for nontraumatic
events, "the court may strike the expert's opinion as based upon con-
jecture or speculation."422
415. FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
416. Graham, supra note 125, at 71.
417. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299,316 & n.20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 931, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); see also Gross, supra note 351, at 1168
(listing "felony convictions, bias, inconsistent statements, [and] errors of fact" as possible
grounds for impeachment).
418. Graham, supra note 125, at 69-70.
419. Id. at 73.
420. Id. (citations omitted).
421. Id. at 70.
422. Id. at 68; see, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability
that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely
upon them must be excluded. The jury will not be permitted to be misled by the glitter of
an expert's accomplishments outside the courtroom." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988).
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Another possible avenue of impeachment is to confront the ex-
pert with contradictory statements in a learned treatise which has
been properly authenticated. 4 s3 Although the expert need not recog-
nize the treatise as a reliable authority, the cross-examiner may call
his or her own expert to testify as to its authoritativeness.424
Nonetheless, the cross-examination of an expert witness has its
challenges.4' One expert on experts has observed:
[O]pposing counsel on cross-examination must probe weak-
nesses in the basis and reasoning of the witness, whether or
not the expert disclosed his or her basis upon direct examina-
tion, without letting the witness reinforce prior direct testi-
mony in the process. Opposing counsel faces an expert
witness more familiar with the subject matter than counsel.
Counsel may use learned treatises to assist in fencing with
the witness. Unfortunately, "fencing with the witness" is the
impression the cross-examination of an expert often gives
the jury, an impression trial counsel would prefer to avoid.
The growing number of experts whose livelihood depends in
large part upon the litigation process compounds the diffi-
culty in conducting a successful, destructive cross-examina-
tion. Such experts, with their vast amount of litigation
experience, become exceptionally proficient in the art of ex-
pert witness advocacy.
426
3. Fictitious party names
Some states allow filing suit under fictitious party names to pro-
tect each party's privacy as well as the defendant's reputation.427 For
example, under California's extended statute of limitations for child
sexual abuse, any complaint filed by a plaintiff twenty-six years of age
or older may not name the defendant "except by 'Doe' designation...
until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging
allegations against any defendant alleged to have committed an act or
423. Graham, supra note 125, at 71. Unlike the common law, which admitted learned
treatises for impeachment purposes only, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow them to be
offered as substantive evidence as well. See FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
424. Graham, supra note 125, at 72.
425. See Gross, supra note 351, at 1167-71.
426. Graham, supra note 125, at 74.
427. See, e.g., Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994); David A. v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. App. 4th 281, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (1993), review denied, No. S037126, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 821 (Feb. 24, 1994); D.P. v. M.J.O., 640 N.E.2d 1323 (Il. App. Ct. 1994); Anony-
mous v. Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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acts of childhood sexual abuse against the plaintiff."' 42 To amend the
complaint with the defendant's true name, the plaintiff's attorney
must execute a certificate of corroborative fact for the court's in cam-
era review.4
29
Alternatively a court may take the initiative and order that the
parties' names be protected.430 That is precisely what one New York
court did, explaining: "[G]iven the infamous stigma that attaches to
the accused abuser.., and the extremely sensitive nature of an action
such as this, the Court is amending the caption, sua sponte, for the
purpose of protecting the name of the defendant .... "
431
4. Court-appointed expert witnesses
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706,432 a federal court may ap-
point expert witnesses on its own motion or on the motion of any
party.433 Presumably the exercise of this discretionary power would
significantly reduce the problems of prejudice that arise when parties
call their own experts, as well as the risk of jury confusion resulting
from a battle of the experts.434 However, it is a device rarely used by
courts. 435 One possible reason for the neglect of Rule 706 is that it
fails to provide sufficient guidance to judges in deciding when to in-
428. CAL. CV. PROC. CODE § 340.10) (West Supp. 1995).
429. Id. § 340.1(k)-(/).
430. See Anonymous, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (citation omitted).
431. Id-
432. Rule 706(a) states, in pertinent part:
The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.... [Tihe witness' deposition may be
taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any
party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including
a party calling the witness.
FED. R. Evw. 706(a).
Rule 706(b) provides for the compensation of expert witnesses "by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs." FED. R. Evw. 706(b). Under Rule
706(c) the court, in its discretion, may disclose to the jury the fact that the court appointed
the expert witness. FED. R. EVID. 706(c). Rule 706(d) allows the parties to call "expert
witnesses of their own selection" in addition to any called by the court. FED. R. EVID.
706(d).
433. FED. R. EVID. 706(a). Even without Rule 706, a court may appoint expert wit-
nesses pursuant to Rule 614. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEIN-
STmN'S EviDENCE, 1 706[01], at 706-8 & n.1 (1994); see FED. R. EvID. 614 ("The court
may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses ....").
434. Gross, supra note 351, at 1188; see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 433,
706[01], at 706-8 to -9 (footnote omitted) (explaining that judges summon their own expert
witnesses "to restore impartiality, to eliminate venality, to procure a higher caliber of ex-
pert and ... to assist the jury to reach a meaningful decision").
435. Gross, supra note 351, at 1190-91.
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voke the rule or who to appoint as an expert. 36 Another suggested
explanation, however, attributes the rarity of court-appointed wit-
nesses to "concerted opposition from the trial bar"437 ostensibly due
to fear of serious harm to our adversarial system of justice.4 38 Under
this theory trial lawyers regard a court-appointed expert as "danger-
ous" and "liable to give unanticipated answers to questions from
either party. Trial lawyers cringe at risks like that. They would rather
rely on adversarial experts, who may be less credible but will certainly
be more tractable and predictable.
439
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Legislative Reform of Rules of Evidence
Generally, legislative reform is preferable to judge-made law be-
cause it provides more stability and uniformity for both courts and
litigants.& 0 Indeed, judges often invoke the doctrine of stare decisis
and the constitutionally mandated separation of powers when they de-
cline to set new precedents. 41 Judges who feel constrained by existing
laws sometimes invite legislators or appellate courts to make re-
forms." - In a case where the defendant allegedly admitted sexually
abusing his daughter between the ages of eight and eleven, the court
reluctantly declined to apply the discovery rule and dismissed the
complaint, explaining:
The decision of this Court... should not be viewed as
reflecting an insensitivity to the possible legislative need for
a more specific statute addressing the special circumstances
of adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse when the
436. Id. at 1191.
437. Id. at 1198.
438. Id. at 1197.
439. Id at 1201.
440. See Silberg, supra note 7, at 1609-10.
441. See, e.g., Bassile v. Covenant House, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233, 237-38 (Sup. Ct. 1991). In
Bassile the plaintiff claimed that PTSD prevented him for 16 years from perceiving the
causal connection between sexual abuse in childhood and subsequent psychological inju-
ries. Id. at 234-35 (referring to plaintiff's complaint at 13). The trial judge granted de-
fendants' motion to dismiss because New York law does not provide for application of the
delayed discovery rule. Id. at 236. In doing so, he noted that "there are many complex and
even conflicting considerations to be reflected upon and weighed in the balance, including
expert medical and psychological evidence" and believed it would be" 'inappropriate and
injudicious to intrude into an area best suited for legislative scrutiny.'" Id. at 238 (quoting
Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299 (N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982)).
442. Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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trauma has contributed to provable psychological damage
and the initiative to assert a right of action is blocked by re-
pression of memory.... Perhaps it is time for the Legisla-
ture to address this important issue ....443
Even when lawmakers see fit to enact reforms, however, statutes
and evidentiary rules are necessarily written in generalized lan-
guage.4 " It remains for the courts to construe them-if the language
is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion4 5-and to apply them to the facts of individual cases." 6 None-
theless, legislators should not sidestep their responsibility to craft laws
that keep pace with the times, and this includes the evolving body of
knowledge about traumatic amnesia. This Comment suggests that
Congress and state legislatures amend their rules of evidence to adopt
the balanced approach described in Part V.
B. House Concurrent Resolution 200
In addition to enacting binding laws, legislators provide leader-
ship by taking powerful symbolic actions. For example, U.S. Con-
gresswoman Pat Schroeder introduced House Concurrent Resolution
200 during the second session of the 103d Congress. 47 Because the
House Judiciary Committee failed to take action before the Novem-
ber 1994 elections, this resolution died when Congress adjourned. 448
This Comment urges Congresswoman Schroeder to reintroduce
the resolution in its original language. "Expressing the sense of Con-
gress in support of efforts to provide justice for adult survivors of
childhood sexual abuse," this resolution would urge the states and the
District of Columbia to, among other things, "enact comprehensive
legislation that affords victims of childhood sexual abuse access to civil
courts and.., consider legislation allowing criminal prosecution based
on the evidence offered by adult survivors of such abuse. ' '44 9
443. Id. (citations omitted).
444. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON ThE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 19
(5th ed. 1984).
445. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917) ("Where the language
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise
.... 2); see also 2A NoRmAN J". SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.01, at 81-91 (5th ed. 1992 rev.) (explaining the "plain meaning rule").
446. KEETON ET AL., supra note 444, at 19.
447. 140 CONG. REC. H87 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder (D-
Colo.)).
448. Telephone Interview with Aide to Congresswoman Schroeder (Apr. 10, 1995).
449. H.R. Con. Res. 200, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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Although congressional resolutions are nonbinding,45 ° the enactment
of House Concurrent Resolution 200 would send an important
message of symbolic support to survivors of child sexual abuse
throughout the country.
VII. CONCLUSION
Absent legislation specifically authorizing or prohibiting the use
of expert testimony in repressed memory cases, courts should allow
qualified witnesses to provide background information that will help
judges decide whether a claim should proceed to trial and help jurors
understand the evidence in the case before them. Fairness calls for a
case-by-case approach to setting appropriate limits on the scope of the
expert testimony and procedural safeguards to minimize its prejudicial
impact. If there ever comes a time when experts can reliably distin-
guish authentic memories from implanted ones, the evidentiary analy-
sis should, of course, change accordingly.
To survive abuse at the hands of an adult requires more strength
than any child should have to muster. To move beyond survival and
toward recovery takes uncommon courage, faith, and patience. To
speak the unspeakable and seek legal redress demands much more. It
asks judges and jurors-indeed, all of society-to face questions most
would rather not address.
It might seem easier for everyone, plaintiffs included, if traumatic
memories would simply remain buried, if survivors would just "forget
it and get on with their lives," or if courts could summarily bar tort
claims filed after a specified period of time. Then no one would have
to decide-often without the benefit of eyewitness testimony or physi-
cal evidence-who is telling the truth about events that may or may
not have happened years ago. No one would have to risk living with
the devastating consequences of an erroneous decision,451 whether it
be denying recovery to a plaintiff who truly was sexually abused as a
child or branding an innocent defendant as a child molester.
The solution that truly would be easiest for everyone is also the
most elusive: guaranteed freedom for every child from sexual, physi-
450. Christy Scattarella, National Spotlight on Adult Survivors of Child Molestation, SE-
ATTLE TIMES, May 16, 1994, at B3 ("Resolutions communicate Congress' intent to states
and urge them to adopt their own laws.").
451. See Myers et al., supra note 8, at 71 ("'Children's recovery from the effects of
abuse, the protection of the community and the protection of innocent persons depends on
accurate decision making.'" (quoting Lucy Berliner, Deciding Whether a Child Has Been
Sexually Abused, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 48
(B. Nicholson & J. Bulkley eds., 1988))).
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cal, and emotional abuse. Precisely how to achieve that goal is the
most difficult question of all.
Joy Lazo*
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